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CONTOURS AND CHAOS: A PROPOSAL FOR COURTS
TO APPLY THE "DANGEROUS PATIENT" EXCEPTION TO
THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
BRIAN P. MCKEEVER*
INTRODUCTION
In Jaffee v. Redmond,' the Supreme Court of the United States held that Federal
Rule of Evidence 5012 protects communications between a psychotherapist and his
patient. The Jaffee decision prevents adverse parties from compelling disclosure or
testimony of communications between a psychotherapist and his patient in any legal
proceeding.3 The Supreme Court, however, sidestepped the question of when
4
exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege might arise. Instead, the Jaffee
Court tacitly condoned an exception when disclosing psychotherapist-patient
communications could protect against a threat of serious harm to the patient or
others.5 Courts and commentators refer to this theoretical exception as the
6
"dangerous patient" exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Thus far,
three federal circuits have addressed whether this exception applies to criminal
cases.7 Not surprisingly, each circuit has defined the circumstances under which the
"dangerous patient" exception applies in dramatically different ways.8 As it stands,
no uniform test exists to determine when, if ever, a "dangerous patient" exception
to the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies in criminal cases.

* Brian P. McKeever currently serves as a law clerk to U.S. Magistrate Judge Jennifer T. LuIm and will
serve as a law clerk to U.S. District Judge Audrey B. Collins, beginning in August of 2004. In addition, he is an
adjunct professor of legal writing at University of Southern California, The Law School. I wish to thank my loving
wife, Xanath Owens, for her invaluable help in writing and revising this article and for the patience and support that
she has shown throughout this process.
1. 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).
2. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states,
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of
Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
3. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15.
4. Id. at 18 n.19.
5. See id.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 301 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (cert. denied, 72
U.S.L.W. 3507 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2004) (No. 03-1118)) [hereinafter Chase I]; George C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient
Exception to the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege: The Tarasoff Duty and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 WASH. L. REV.
33 (1999); Melissa L Nelken, The Limits of Privilege: The Developing Scope of FederalPsychotherapist-Patient
Privilege Law, 20 REv. LrTIG. 1, 33 (2000); B. Joseph Wadsworth, EVIDENCE-Recognition of a Federal
Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996), 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 873
(1997).

7. See United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (en bane) [hereinafter Chase 11]; Chase 1, 301
F.3d 1019; United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir.
1998).
8. See Chase 11, 340 F.3d at 989 n.5, 991-92; Chase 1, 301 F.3d at 1025; Hayes, 227 F.3d at 586; Glass,
133 F.3d at 1360.
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The difficulty courts have faced in formulating such a test arises from the tension
between two equally important, but often competing, interests: (1) a patient's
interest in obtaining unfettered mental health treatment and (2) society's interest in
protecting intended victims from known risks. A solution that remains faithful to the
Court's holding in Jaffee must find a way to resolve this tension by carving out an
exception that properly balances these two competing interests. This article seeks
to fill that need by providing a workable and uniform framework under which courts
may apply the "dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases.
The article comprises four sections. Section I reviews the Jaffee decision and the
resulting psychotherapist-patient privilege. Section II discusses recent federal case
law addressing whether a "dangerous patient" exception to the privilege exists in
criminal cases. Section II summarizes the different tests governing the "dangerous
patient" exception that have emerged among the circuits. Section 1H1 urges courts to
apply a "dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases to protect third parties from
known threats of harm. Finally, section IV proposes a model for courts to uniformly
apply a "dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases.
I. THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
States have long recognized some form of physician-patient privilege. 9 By 1943,
the vast majority of states protected communications between patients and
physicians.' ° And by 1996, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had enacted
some form of psychotherapist-patient privilege." On the federal level, however, a
split over the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege had developed among
the circuits.12 By 1995, two circuits had recognized the privilege, while four had
rejected its existence. 13
Against this backdrop came the-Seventh Circuit's decision in Jaffee v. Redmond.14
In Jaffee, the Seventh Circuit recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege that
9. See, for example, an 1829 New York statute stating,
No person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be allowed to disclose any
information which he may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character, and
which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or
to do any act for him as a surgeon.
N.Y. REV. STATS. § 73 (1829).
10. See I CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 98 (5th ed. 1999) (noting that only
seventeen states had no psychotherapist-patient privilege by 1943).
11. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12 n. II (listing state statutes that recognize psychotherapist privilege).
12. See id. at 7 (noting split among circuits).
13. See id.; see also Nelken, supra note 6, at 4 n.9 ("The Second and Sixth Circuits had recognized the
privilege.. .but the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits had declined to do so.").
14. 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995). In Jaffee, an on-duty police officer, Mary Lu Redmond, shot a man named
Ricky Allen. Id. at 1348-49. The administrator of Allen's estate brought a wrongful death suit against Redmond
and her employer. Id. at 1348. During pre-trial discovery, Allen's estate discovered that, after the shooting,
Redmond had attended approximately fifty counseling sessions with a clinical social worker. See id.at 1350. Allen's
estate sought access to all notes from those meetings. Id. Both Redmond and her social worker refused to produce
the notes, arguing that a psychotherapist-patient privilege protected the information contained in those notes. Id.
The district court disagreed and ordered Redmond and her social worker to produce the notes and answer questions
at a deposition. Id. at 1350-51. When they refused, the district court instructed the jury that it could draw a negative
inference against Redmond. Id. at 1351. Eventually, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Allen's estate. Id. at 1352.
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Redmond successfully urged the Seventh Circuit to recognize a psychotherapistpatient privilege. Id. at 1355-58. Thereafter, Allen's estate filed a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme
Court. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 7-8.
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5
protected psychotherapist-patient communications only in limited circumstances.'
Specifically, the privilege protected such communications only where the patient's
the need for disclosure of the contents of the patient's
privacy concerns outweighed
6
counseling sessions.'
On appeal from the Seventh Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an eight-to-one
decision, affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision. 7 The Supreme Court found that
"reason and experience" dictate that a psychotherapist-patient privilege "'promotes
18
sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.'" The
9 First, the
Court identified two sets of interests that the privilege would promote.
privilege would serve the private interest of the patient.2" The Court stated that
effective therapy depends on an "atmosphere of confidence and trust," an
atmosphere where a patient can freely disclose to the psychotherapist his most
intimate thoughts. 2' Once the psychotherapist and the patient develop that
22
atmosphere, the patient might disclose embarrassing or disgraceful thoughts.
Consequently, the Court reasoned, "the mere possibility of disclosure may impede23
development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.,
Second, the Court reasoned that the privilege offers a commensurate benefit to
the public at large.24 Specifically, the Court stated that the privilege "facilitat[es] the
provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental
or emotional problem."25 The Court then declared that the citizenry's mental health
constitutes a "public good of transcendent importance. 26
Next, the Court compared the benefits of serving these public and private interests
2
to the benefits of allowing psychotherapists to testify against their patientsY. The

15. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1355-58.
at 1357.
16. See id.
However, we also note that the privilege we recognize in a case of this nature requires an
assessment of whether, in the interests of justice, the evidentiary need for the disclosure of the
contents of a patient's counseling sessions outweighs that patient's privacy interests....
Accordingly, we will determine the appropriate scope of the privilege "by balancing the interests
protected by shielding the evidence sought with those advanced by disclosure."
Id. (quoting In Re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640 (6th Cir. 1983)).
17. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 3, 18. Justice Scalia wrote the only dissenting opinion. Id. at 18-36. Justice Rehnquist
joined the last part of Scalia's dissent. Id. at 18. In that part, Scalia rejected the majority's holding that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege should extend to social workers. Id. at 27-36.
18. Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted).
19. Id.at 10-11.
20. Id. at 10.
21. Id. at 10-11; see also Sam A. Mackie, Proof of Unauthorized Disclosure of Confidential Patient
Information by a Psychotherapist,24 AM. JUR. 3D Proofof Facts 123 (1994).
Some of psychotherapy's aims are to change maladaptive behavior patterns, improve
interpersonal relationships, resolve inner conflicts that cause personal distress, modify inaccurate
assumptions about a person's self and environment, and foster a more definite sense of selfidentity, which itself promotes individual growth and leads to a more meaningful and fulfilling
existence.
Id. at 129.
22. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 11.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at I 112.
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Court concluded that the former outweighed the latter.2 In fact, the Court predicted
that, without the privilege, patients would be less likely to disclose statements
against their own interest. 29 As such, allowing psychotherapists to testify against
their patients would yield no cognizable benefit.30
The Court then attempted to define the contours of the new privilege.31 The Court
began by explicitly rejecting the Seventh Circuit's balancing of interests approach.32
According to the Court, the Seventh Circuit's balancing approach would create
uncertainty for patients.33 In each instance, a judge would have to determine whether
the patient's privacy interests outweighed the evidentiary need for disclosure.34 Such
a case-by-case approach, the Court stated, would provide no effective way for the
patient to know whether his confidential statements would remain confidential.35
Consequently, the Court concluded that, under these circumstances, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege would amount to no privilege at all.36
The Court, therefore, adopted a rule that would allow patients to predict with
certainty whether the privilege would protect their statements from discovery.37
Under that rule, a patient is entitled to invoke the psychotherapist-patient privilege
if he proves three things: (1) the statements were confidential when made; (2) he
made the statements to a licensed psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinical social
worker; and (3) he made the statements in the course of diagnosis or treatment.38
Despite establishing a seemingly bright-line rule, the Court indicated that it did not
intend to announce an absolute privilege for courts to rigidly apply in all future
cases. Indeed, the Court expressly declined to "delineate [the] full contours [of the
privilege] in a way that would 'govern all conceivable future questions in this
39Rather,
area.' ,,
the Court left the details of the privilege to be decided on a case-bycase basis.4" Most notably, in an ambiguous footnote,4 the Court hinted that the
protection of the patient or of a third party might outweigh the privilege in certain
circumstances:

28. Id.
at11.
29. Id. at 12.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 15-18. The Court also ruled that the privilege applied with equal force to licensed psychiatrists,
psychologists, and clinical
social
workers. Id. at 15-17.
32. Id. at 17.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at18.
36. Id. (quoting Upjohn Co.v.United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)) ("An uncertain privilege, or one
which purports tobe certain but results
inwidely varying applications by the courts, islittle
better than no privilege
at all.").
37. See id. at 18.
38. See id. at 15.
39. Id. at 18 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393).
40. Id.

41. See, e.g., Stacy Aronowitz, Following the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege Down the Bumpy Road
Paved by Jaffee v. Redmond, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 307, 319 ("In Jaffee, the Supreme Court determined that
those communications between licensed psychotherapists and their patients made in the course of diagnosis or
treatment are privileged. In so doing, the Supreme Court created a vague and ill-defined privilege bound for
inconsistent interpretations among the lower federal courts.").
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Although it would be premature to speculate about most future developments in
federal psychotherapist privilege, we do not doubt that there are situations in
which the privilege must give way, for example, if a serious threat of harm to the
patient or42 to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the
therapist.

This footnote, often referred to as the "Jaffee footnote," has created a split among
the circuits over its meaning.43 The remainder of this article discusses the nature of
this split and offers a workable approach for courts to apply the "dangerous patient"
exception in criminal cases.
II. RECENT CASE LAW INVOLVING THE JAFFEEFOOTNOTE
Since the Supreme Court decided Jaffee, three circuits have addressed whether
a "dangerous patient" exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege exists in
criminal cases." From these circuits have emerged starkly divergent views on
whether and when such an exception exists.45 In Glass, for example, the Tenth
Circuit advocated a strict two-part test to determine whether a physician may testify
to statements that he learned in treating the accused. 46 By contrast, the Sixth Circuit
in United States v. Hayes refused to recognize a "dangerous patient" exception in
any criminal case.47 Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit in Chase I created a relatively
undefined and broad exception to the privilege allowing psychotherapists to testify
against their patients.4" In Chase II, however, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Sixth
Circuit's reasoning and, for the most part, rejected a dangerous patient exception in
criminal cases. 49 Below, each case and the resulting "dangerous patient" exception
are discussed.
1. United States v. Glass
The Tenth Circuit decided the first post-Jaffee case to address the "dangerous
patient" exception.5" In Glass, the Tenth Circuit held that Jaffee allowed an
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege where disclosure was the only way
to prevent a threat of serious injury to third parties.5 1 The patient in Glass, Archie
Monroe Glass, voluntarily admitted himself to a "mental health unit for treatment
42. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19.
43. See supra note 8.
44. See Chase II, 340 F.3d 978 (en banc); Chase !, 301 F.3d 1019 (per curiam); United States v. Hayes, 227
F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998).
45. See supra note 8.
46. See Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360. Other commentators disagree that the Tenth Circuit created a strict test in
Glass. For example, Professor Nelken believes the Tenth Circuit created an "overly broad" exception to the general
psychotherapist privilege. Nelken, supra note 6,at 33-34 ("The lack of any clear reference or context for the
[Supreme] Court's footnote in the Jaffee opinion has led the Tenth Circuit to create an overly broad exception to
the privilege in one of the few post-Jaffee appellate opinions to date."). Professor Nelken, however, expressed this
view before the Ninth Circuit decided Chase L As discussed in this section, the Ninth Circuit's approach in Chase
I created a much broader exception to the psychotherapist privilege than did the Tenth Circuit's in Glass.
47. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 586.
48. See Chase 1,301 F.3d at 1024.
49. See Chase I, 340 F.3d at 992.
50. See Glass, 133 F.3d 1356.
51. See id.
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of his 'ongoing mental illness."' 5 2 A psychotherapist, Dr. Shantharam Darbe,
examined Glass on several occasions.53
During one examination, Glass told Dr. Darbe that "'he wanted to get in the
history books like Hinkley [sic] and wanted to shoot Bill Clinton and Hilary
[sic]."' 54 Dr. Darbe took no action in response to Glass's statement. Instead, he
released Glass a few days later, and Glass agreed to participate in an outpatient
mental health treatment, but he soon disappeared after being released.56 Secret
Service agents were notified of Glass's disappearance, and they eventually contacted
Dr. Darbe.57 Dr. Darbe told the agents about Glass's desire to kill the president and
first lady. 8 Glass was later "[i]ndicted for knowingly and willfully threatening to
kill the President of the United States."5 9
Before trial, Glass moved to exclude the statements he had made to Dr. Darbe,
arguing that the psychotherapist-patient privilege protected those statements from
disclosure.6 ° In response, the government claimed that Dr. Darbe had determined
that Glass presented a danger to President Clinton.6' Once Dr. Darbe had reached
that determination, he incurred a duty to protect the president.62 The district court
agreed and declared the psychotherapist-patient privilege inapplicable where a
person with an established history of mental illness, such as Glass, threatens a third
63
party.

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that a psychotherapist could testify about a
patient's threatening statements if (1) the threat "was serious when it was uttered"
and (2) disclosing the threat "was the only means of averting harm to the [victim]
when the disclosure was made."' Unable to determine whether Glass's statements
satisfied this test, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings.65

52. Id. at 1357.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Id. Glass also promised to stay at his father's residence while participating in the outpatient treatment.
Id. Shortly thereafter, an outpatient nurse discovered that Glass had vacated his father's residence. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (2000)).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. Citing the Jaffee footnote and a psychotherapist's duty to protect his patient's victims, the district
court found the psychotherapist-patient privilege inapplicable when a patient makes a credible threat to kill another.
See id. The Tenth Circuit later reversed the district court's conclusion as lacking any objective factual support
indicating that the patient actually presented a serious threat to the president. See id. ("This conclusion was made
without presentation of evidence and, from our review of the record, appears to be supported factually only by
argument contained in the government's trial court brief").
64. Id. at 1360 (emphasis added).
65. See id. at 1359-60. On remand, the district court found that Glass's statements satisfied the two-part test
and admitted Dr. Darbe's testimony. See Nelken, supranote 6, at 35 (citing Order,Apr. 9, 1998, Case No. CR-9694-T, U.S. District Court, Western District of Oklahoma (Thompson, J.) at 2, 5, 8).
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2. United States v. Hayes
Nearly three years after Glass, the Sixth Circuit decided United States v. Hayes.66
In Hayes, the district court initially, and the Sixth Circuit later, excluded repeated
and detailed threats made by Roy Lee Hayes, a U.S. Postal Worker, to various
psychotherapists.67 In February 1998, Hayes sought treatment at the Veterans
Administration Mountain Home Hospital (MHH) for severe depression and fits of
"irregular behavior., 68 During treatment, 69 Hayes told a psychotherapist, Dr. Hansen,
that he wanted to kill his supervisor but that fear of losing his job prevented him
71
from doing so. 70 Shortly after being released, Hayes readmitted himself to MHH.
He again stated that he wished to kill his supervisor, but the MHH treating
physicians concluded that he could control this desire and that he understood the
consequences of his actions.72 Dr. Radford, another psychotherapist at MHH,
warned that he would not keep Hayes' threats confidential. 73 But no one on the
MHH staff ever disclosed Hayes' threats to the intended victim or to law enforcement officials.74

A few weeks after being released from MHH, 75 Hayes consulted a social worker
named James Edward Van Dyke at a local Veterans' center.76 Van Dyke initially
warned Hayes that if he determined that Hayes posed a risk of serious harm to a
third party, Van Dyke would warn the third party of that risk.77 Undeterred, Hayes
declared that he wished to kill his supervisor and even detailed how he would
murder her.78 During a subsequent visit with Van Dyke, Hayes reiterated his desire
to kill his supervisor7 9 and described "in great detail" how he would do so.80 Van
Dyke warned again that he would not keep confidential any serious threats that
Hayes made.8 The next day, Van Dyke informed Hayes' supervisor about the
threats 82 and Hayes was later charged with threatening to murder a federal official.83
Van Dyke also warned Hayes' intended victim about Hayes' threats.'

66. 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000).
67. See id. at 587.
68. Id. at 580.
69. See id. The MHH staff initially diagnosed Hayes with "major depression, accompanied by severe
psychotic features," and began treating him.
70. Id.
71. Id.

72. Id.
73. Id. at588.
74. See id. at 580.
75. See id. The MHH staff released Hayes on February 26, 1998, "with a prescription for various
psychotropic drugs."
76. See id.
77. See id.
Hayes posed no serious threat and allowed
78. See id. Despite Hayes' threats, Van Dyke concluded that
Hayes toleave.
79. Id.
80. Id. In particular, Hayes indicated that he knew details about the supervisor's home and schedule. Id.
81. See id.
82. Id.
at581.
83. Id.
84. See id.
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Before trial, Hayes moved to suppress all statements that he had made to his
various psychotherapists.85 The magistrate judge deciding the motion ruled
inadmissible all such statements, except those that Van Dyke had revealed to Hayes'
intended victim. 86 The magistrate reasoned that Hayes' statements to Van Dyke were
not privileged because disclosing Hayes' threats was the only way to avert harm to
Hayes' intended victim. 8 7 The district court, citing the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Glass, went further, ordering suppression of Hayes' statements to Van Dyke in
addition to Hayes' statements to the other MHH psychotherapists.88 Specifically, the
district court relied on Van Dyke's admission that he had considered no other option
to disclosing Hayes' statements to the intended victim. 89 The district court also
found significant that Van Dyke disclosed Hayes' statements in response to an order
from Van Dyke' s supervisor.9" The district court, therefore, granted Hayes' motion
and, subsequently, dismissed the case. 9'
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit rejected the Tenth Circuit's decision in Glass,
holding instead that no "dangerous patient" exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege exists in criminal cases. 92 The Sixth Circuit distinguished between a
physician's duty to protect potential victims and the subsequent act of testifying
about his patient's statements.93 The therapist's duty to protect, the court declared,
preserved and protected the "health and safety of innocent third parties."94 These
benefits outweighed the benefit derived from maintaining the confidentiality of a
patient's "life-threatening communications."95 A therapist's subsequent testimony
against his patient, on the other hand, yielded no commensurate benefit. 96 On the
contrary, the court stated that a dangerous patient was unlikely to follow through
with his threat once court proceedings had begun.97

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 586.
See id. at 583-84.
Before turning to the question whether it is advisable to graft a "dangerous patient" exception
for criminal proceedings onto the federal psychotherapist/patient privilege, we will first clarify
a misperception held by Hayes, the government, and, to some extent, the Tenth Circuit that the
standard of care exercised by a treating psychotherapist prior to complying with (or, for that
matter, failing to comply with) a state's "duty to protect" requirement is somehow pertinent to
the applicability of the psychotherapist/patient privilege in criminal proceedings. We think there
is little correlation between those two inquiries.
Id. at 583.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id at 584-85.
97. Id. at 584.
We see only a marginal connection, if any at all, between a psychotherapist's action in notifying
a third party (for his own safety) of a patient's threat to kill or injure him and a court's refusal
to permit the therapist to testify about such threat (in the interest of protecting the
psychotherapist/patient relationship) in a later prosecution of the patient for making it. State law
requirements that psychotherapists take action to prevent serious and credible threats from being
carried out serve a far more immediate function than the proposed "dangerous patient"
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Moreover, the Sixth Circuit predicted that, even if it recognized a "dangerous
patient" exception, courts could not consistently apply it in criminal cases.98 For
example, the court noted the danger of "conditioning the applicability of the
proposed 'dangerous patient' exception on the standard of care exercised by a treating psychotherapist."99 Under such a standard, the court cautioned, future cases
would "devolve into a battle of experts" over whether the psychotherapist reasonably disclosed the patient's threat.1°° And the ensuing battles would likely yield
erratic results.'' Furthermore, the court declared that a federal testimonial privilege
how each state defines a psychotherapist's "'reasonable' proshould not depend on
02
fessional conduct."'
Next, the court outlined three reasons weighing against recognizing a "dangerous
patient" exception in criminal cases.'0 3 First, the exception would have a "deleterious effect on the 'atmosphere of confidence and trust' in the psychotherapist/patient
relationship."'" Second, improving the citizenry's mental health outweighed any
benefit resulting from a psychotherapist's testimony about his patient's confidential
communications. 5 Third, the court emphasized that the evidence jurisprudence of
the majority of states recognized no analogous "dangerous patient" exception in
criminal cases."°
The court, however, condoned a "dangerous patient" exception in involuntary
hospitalization proceedings.0 7 In fact, it argued that the Supreme Court intended to
carve out just such an exception in the Jaffee footnote. "We think the Jaffee footnote
was referring to the fact that psychotherapists will sometimes need to testify in court
9,lO8
In
proceedings, such as those for the involuntary commitment of a patient ....
such circumstances, the psychotherapist's testimony may "ultimately improve [the
exception. Unlike the situation presented in Tarasoff,the threat articulated by a defendant such
as Hayes is rather unlikely to be carried out once court proceedings have begun against him.
Id. at 583-84.
98. See id.
at 584.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 584-86.
104. Id. at 584 (citations omitted).
105. See id. at 585. The court conceded that allowing a psychotherapist to testify against his patient could
advance a public end. The court, however, did not identify the precise public end that such testimony could serve.
But the court concluded that the end would not justify the means:
We think that allowing a psychotherapist to testify against his or her patient in a criminal
prosecution about statements made to the therapist by the patient for the purposes of treatment
arguably "serv[es] [a] public end," but it is an end that does not justify the means. The Jaffee
footnote recognizes that in cases such as this, there are at least two interests at stake: the
improvement of our citizens' mental health achieved, in part, by open dialogue in psychotherapy,
on the one hand, and the protection of innocent third parties, on the other. Both are "public ends"
which the federal common law should foster. We believe, therefore, that the Jaffee footnote is
no more than an aside by Justice Stevens to the effect that the federal psychotherapist/patient
privilege will not operate to impede a psychotherapist's compliance with the professional duty
to protect identifiable third parties from serious threats of harm.
Id.
106. Id. (noting that only California had enacted a "dangerous patient" exception applicable to criminal cases
as part of its evidence code).
107. See id.
108. Id.
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patient's] mental state."' 9 Using that same testimony in criminal proceedings,
however, would yield no equivalent good to either the patient or the public."0
Finally, the court rejected the argument that Hayes had waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege by continuing to make threats despite Van Dyke's
repeated disclosure warnings."' The court reasoned that no psychotherapist had ever
told Hayes that they could later testify against him in a criminal proceeding." 2 The
court concluded that, absent this warning, Hayes could not have waived his right to
protect his confidential statements from disclosure." 3
In dissent, Judge Boggs attacked the majority's analysis in rejecting a "constructive waiver" theory." 4 Judge Boggs argued that Hayes relinquished all expectations
of confidentiality once he received explicit warnings that Van Dyke and Dr. Radford
would not keep Hayes' threatening statements confidential." 5 Absent that expectation of confidentiality, nothing prevented Van Dyke from testifying about Hayes'
statements." 16
3. Chase I
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Chase (Chase I) affirmed a
district court's ruling allowing a psychotherapist to testify about her patient's threats
toward agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)." 7 The patient, Steven
Gene Chase, received treatment from Dr. Kay Dieter beginning in 1997 for irritability, anger, and depression." 8 In August 1999, Chase showed Dr. Dieter an
appointment book containing the names, addresses, and social security numbers of

109. Id.
110. Id.
Once in prison, even partly as a consequence of the testimony of a therapist to whom the patient
came for help, the probability of the patient's mental health improving diminishes significantly
and a stigma certainly attaches after the patient's sentence is served. While, as with involuntary
hospitalization, incarceration would serve the "public end" of neutralizing the threat posed by
a patient, the price paid in achieving that neutralization may often be that many patients will not
seek the professional help they need to regain their mental and emotional health.
Id.
11. See id. at 586. Van Dyke had repeatedly and explicitly warned Hayes that he would disclose any serious
threat made towards a third party. Id. at 580. Dr. Radford at MHH had similarly warned Hayes previously. Despite
this, Hayes continued to threaten his supervisor.
112. Id. at 586.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 587-89.
115. See id. at 587-88.
116. See id. Judge Boggs found two factors significant to his waiver analysis. First, Hayes had received three
separate warnings that his threats would not be kept confidential. See id. Second, despite the warnings, Hayes
continued to make escalating violent threats towards his supervisor. See id. Under such circumstances, Judge Boggs
concluded that Hayes had expressly waived any privilege he may have had in the threatening statements. Id. at
588-89. The United States does not argue that Hayes constructively waived his privilege, which would occur had
he repeated the threats to a third party. Rather it argues, correctly in my view, that Hayes waived any privilege
purely and simply, by continuing to threaten after he had been given notice that his threats would not be held in
confidence.
117. See Chase 1, 301 F.3d at 1019-31.
118. Id. at 1021. Dr. Dieter diagnosed Chase with "bipolar type I[ disorder with episodes of intense anger and
obsessive rumination against certain individuals." Id. From the beginning, Chase displayed anger toward, and made
threats against, a number of people. Id.

Winter 2004]

"DANGEROUS PATIENT" EXCEPTION

people whom Chase planned to kill.119 The list consisted of people that Chase had
encountered in business and legal dealings. 2 ' Additionally, the list contained the
names of "two FBI agents who had been assigned to investigate complaints" that
Chase had previously lodged.' 2 1 Chase described his homicidal thoughts toward all
of these people to Dr. Dieter and recalled threatening several of the individuals in
the past. 122In response, Dr. Dieter warned Chase that, if she believed that23he planned
to murder someone, she would reveal his plans to the intended victim.1
Two months later, on October 18, 1999, Chase phoned Dr. Dieter and told her
that he had fought with his wife and felt "extremely upset."' 24 He then ominously
25
stated that he had life insurance if anything should happen to him. These statements alarmed Dr. Dieter, and she sought advice from her supervisor and the clinic's
legal counsel. 26 They instructed Dr. Dieter to report Chase's statements to local
police, which she did the next day. 1 27 About six days later, FBI agents contacted Dr.
Dieter.128 She then relayed Chase's statements to the FBI agents and complied with
session. 29
their request to secretly obtain further details from Chase during his next
At that session, Chase again made threatening statements. 30 Dr. Dieter reminded
Chase of her duty to warn those individuals of the danger that Chase posed to
32
them.' 31 Chase reiterated that he did not intend to act on his impulses. Shortly
thereafter, FBI agents informed Dr. Dieter that they used the information she had
provided them to obtain a search warrant for Chase's home. 33 Chase was subsequently charged with two counts involving threatening to kill FBI agents and one
firearm count.' 34
Before trial, Chase moved to exclude the threats that he had made during his
counseling sessions.135 The district court denied Chase's motion, finding the psycho36
therapist-patient privilege inapplicable to Chase's threats. In so concluding, the

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. Chase also confided to Dr. Dieter that he had begun drinking. Id.
123. See id. Chase assured Dr. Dieter that he did not intend to take any immediate action. Id. Thereafter, Dr.
Dieter told her supervisor about Chase's statements and asked whether those statements obligated her to warn the
identified individuals. Id. Dr. Dieter's supervisor advised her to obtain more information from Chase before
disclosing his statements. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 1021-22.
130. See id. at 1022. First, he declared that, if an existing lien on his home were not lifted, "he would get his
guns, get in his vehicle and have himself some justice." Id. Second, he declared that he had located all but four
people on the list that he had previously shown to Dr. Dieter. See id. at 1021-22. He also claimed that he was
targeting their children. Id. at 1022.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id. Chase also sought to exclude evidence of threats he had made to others against individuals who
were not FBI agents. These threats, however, were not subject to the "dangerous patient" exception, as Chase had
not uttered them to psychotherapists. See id. at 1022-23.
136. Id. at 1022.
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district court relied on three factors: "(1) that Chase's threats were serious when
uttered, (2) that harm was imminent, and (3)' that
disclosure to authorities was the
37
only means of averting the threatened harm."'
Citing the psychotherapist's duty to protect, 38 a three-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit held the psychotherapist-patient privilege does not protect a patient's threats
of imminent and unavoidable harm:
Just as the ethics of the profession recognize a "dangerous patient" exception to
the psychotherapist's obligation of confidentiality that permits disclosure of
otherwise-confidential information when (1) a threat of harm is serious and
imminent and (2) the harm can be averted only by means of disclosure by the
therapist, we hold that the same exception extends to the psychotherapist's
permitted testimony under the same circumstances. This holding is faithful both
3
to the Jaffee footnote and to the obvious policy considerations that underlie it.
The three-judge panel found the facts surrounding Chase's threats justified
admitting Dr. Dieter's testimony against Chase for two reasons. 4 ' First, the panel
noted that objective evidence supported Dr. Dieter's belief that Chase posed an
imminent threat.' 41 Specifically, the panel relied on the following evidence: (1)
Chase had compiled a list of names in his appointment book of persons he desired
to kill; (2) he had taken steps to track down his victims; (3) he "had mentioned his
life insurance policy"; and (4) he "had described other stresses in his life," such as
consuming alcohol and arguing with his wife. 42 The panel, however, declined to
state whether a psychotherapist's mere subjective
belief of imminent harm could
43
trigger the "dangerous patient" exception.
Second, the panel found that Dr. Dieter "reasonably considered disclosure to law
enforcement authorities to be the only effective means of averting harm."'" The
panel noted that Dr. Dieter "considered initiating civil commitment procedures but
concluded that it was unlikely that Chase would be held for longer than seventy-two
hours due to his lack of a committable mental illness."' 45 Moreover, Dr. Dieter
believed that Chase could possibly harm himself if committed against his will.'46

137. Id. A jury ultimately convicted Chase of threatening to murder federal law enforcement officers and
Chase appealed. See id. at 1020, 1023. Chase was also charged with two additional counts: (1) threatening to murder
the FBI agents who in his view had failed properly to investigate his complaints and (2) possession of firearms by
a person adjudicated by the Social Security Administration as a mental defective. The district court, however,
subsequently dismissed the last count. Id. at 1022. The jury acquitted Chase on the second count. id. at 1023.
138. Id. at 1024. The three-judge panel refused to apply a crime/fraud exception to Chase's statements.
According to the panel, Chase made his threats in the course of treatment; he did not make the threats to promote
a particular crime or fraud. Id. at 1025 n.3.
139. Id. at 1024.
140. See id. at 1025.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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4. Chase II
Shortly after the three-judge panel's decision in Chase I, the Ninth Circuit
vacated the panel's decision and ordered that the case be reheard en banc.' 47
Borrowing largely from the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hayes, the Ninth Circuit
abandoned the reasoning of Chase I and found the "dangerous patient" exception
inapplicable to criminal cases. 4
In so holding, the Ninth Circuit first distinguished between a physician's duty to
protect third parties and the subsequent act of testifying about the patient's statements in court.' The court concluded that, in Chase's case, sufficient objective
evidence existed to support the physician's decision to disclose Chase's threats to
law enforcement officials. 50 But the court refused to equate a proper breach of a
with a license to testify about the patient's statements in a
patient's confidentiality
5
criminal proceeding.' 1
The court then cited four reasons for declining to recognize a "dangerous patient"
exception in criminal cases.'52 First, the court found that the states' nearly uniform
refusal to recognize a "dangerous patient" exception counseled53against creating such
an exception to the federal psychothetapist-patient privilege.
Second, the court cited the different purposes behind the proposed "dangerous
patient" exception and the physician-patient confidentiality laws among the various
' In particular, the court observed that the laws governing a physician's duty
states. 54
to breach a patient's confidentiality existed only to protect third parties. 55 In
proceeding achieved no
contrast, a physician's subsequent testimony at a criminal
t56
parallel goal, other than proving a completed crime.
Third, the court looked to the recommendations by the Judicial Conference
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence. 5 7 In 1972, the Advisory Committee
had recommended proposed Rule 504 establishing a psychotherapist-patient testimonial privilege.' 58 The court found it significant that proposed Rule 504 identified
three exceptions to the privilege; however, Rule 504 did not provide for a "danger-

147. United States v. Chase, 314 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2002).
340 F.3d at 991-92 (en banc).
148. Chase 11,
149. See id. at 984-85.
150. See id. at 985.
at 987-89.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 985-92.
153. See id. at 985-86. Uke the Sixth Circuit in Hayes, the Ninth Circuit, en banc, observed that California
stood alone among the states in providing for an evidentiary "dangerous patient" exception. Unlike California, most
states declined to equate a physician's duty to protect third parties with a waiver of the testimonial privilege. See
id. at 986. Consequently, the court reasoned that recognizing a "dangerous patient" exception on the federal level
would undermine state confidentiality laws.
154. Id. at 986-89.
155. Id. at 987.
156. Id. Relatedly, the court noted the differing standards among the state laws governing when a physician
must breach a patient's confidentiality. Id. at 987-88. These varying standards, according to the court, exemplified
why courts should not equate a physician's state-imposed duty to breach confidentiality with a waiver of the
patient's testimonial privilege. Moreover, the court opined that most patients would be unaware of the law
governing a physician's duty to disclose in the state in which the patients reside, and, even if the patients know of
a given state's disclosure law, they would not expect that the physician would be able to testify in a criminal
proceeding, because most states prohibited such testimony. Id. at 988-89.
157. Id. at 989-90.
158. Id. at 989 (citing Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-41 (1972)).
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ous patient" or future crime exception.159 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the
Supreme Court of the United States ultimately rejected Rule 504 and, instead,
recognized the privilege under the "more open-ended Rule 501 ."'60 Nevertheless, the
court believed that the Supreme Court's favorable citation to Rule 504 warranted the
court's reliance on Rule 504 in resolving unclear questions about exception to the

privilege. 161
Fourth, the Ninth Circuit cited public policy reasons against recognizing a
"dangerous patient" exception. 162 In particular, the court observed that the exception
would negatively impact the physician-patient relationship. 163 In contrast,
recognizing the exception would provide no commensurate benefit to society. 6 For
example, the court noted that, in the usual case, the physician's testimony would be
only cumulative of other evidence offered to prove the victim's guilt.' 65 Moreover,
the court stated that effective therapeutic treatment was likely to provide a more
long-lasting solution than would temporary incarceration.1 6" Thus, after balancing
the interests, the court concluded that protecting the physician-patient relationship
67
outweighed "the marginal" benefits derived from recognizing the exception. 1
The Ninth Circuit, however, stated its conclusion would not prevent a psychotherapist from testifying about her patient's statements in state court proceedings, such
as civil commitment hearings. 68 Indeed, the court noted that most states allowed
169
psychotherapists to testify in civil commitment proceedings.
Moreover, in a cryptic footnote, the Ninth Circuit suggested that its opinion
would not preclude a psychotherapist's testimony at a criminal proceeding in every
instance. 70 Specifically, the court envisioned a different result if the psychotherapist
had explicitly informed the patient of his obligation to testify about the patient's
threatening statements in a subsequent criminal proceeding:
In [Chase's] case, Dr. Dieter did not inform Defendant that she might testify
against him in court, although she did warn him that she would disclose his
threats for the purpose of protecting intended victims. We need not decide
whether the result would be different if a psychotherapist informed a patient
ahead of time that she would testify in court; arguably, the patient in that

159. Id.
160. Id. at 990.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 990-92.
163. Id. at 990.
164. Id. at 991.
165. See id. at 991.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 99 1-92. The Ninth Circuit likewise rejected the notion that the Jaffee Court's dictum, contained
in footnote nineteen of that decision, condoned a "dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases. See id. at 984.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Jaffee Court's footnote "presaged the issues" presented before the Ninth
Circuit. But the Ninth Circuit declined to find that the Jaffee Court meant to establish an actual exception to the
physician-patient relationship. Rather, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Jaffee Court's language about "the privilege
giv[ing] way" to prevent "a serious threat of harm" as only "elliptically" endorsing a physician's recognized duty
to disclose a patient's threats of harm to intended victims. The Ninth Circuit, therefore, found no support for
recognizing a "dangerous patient" exception in the Jaffee decision.
168. Id.at991.

169. Id.
170. Id. at 988 n.5.
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circumstance would be agreeing that the subsequent communication was not
"
'
confidential.17

and
Concurring in the majority's result, Judge Kleinfeld, joined by Judges Nelson
72 Judge
footnote.'
Jaffee
the
of
interpretation
majority's
Clifton, attacked the
Kleinfeld believed that the Jaffee Court's footnote spoke173"expressly to the issue in
this case," even though it spoke to the issue only in dicta. Nevertheless, noting the
due deference courts apply to Supreme Court dicta, Judge Kleinfeld concluded the
Supreme Court's dictum, in this case, carried even more persuasive value than in
ordinary circumstances.' 74 Judge Kleinfeld ridiculed the majority's view that the
75
Supreme Court's dictum referred only to the psychotherapist's duty to warn.
Judge Kleinfeld suggested that the majority had merely subverted the Supreme
Court's plain language to fit its own ends:
The majority reads the words "the privilege must give way" to mean that the
privilegedoes not give way....But that is not what the Court said. And it makes
no sense to say, as the majority apparently does, that the Court was speaking to
the issue of whether a psychotherapist may disclose a serious threat to the
prospective victim, rather than whether the psychotherapist may testify in court
about it....There is just no getting around the proposition that Jaffee said, and
meant, that the psychotherapist-patient "privilege76must give way," referring to
the privilege under Rule 501 to refuse to testify.'
Judge Kleinfeld then explained why "reason and experience" supported the
"dangerous patient" exception in Chase's case."' First, Judge Kleinfeld found that
78
Chase had waived the psychotherapist privilege. In particular, Judge Kleinfeld
observed Chase's psychotherapist had explicitly warned Chase that she would not
79
keep his threats confidential; yet, he continued making such threats.'

Second, Judge Kleinfeld challenged the majority's conclusion about the80impact
of the "dangerous patient" exception on the physician-patient relationship. Judge
Kleinfeld argued that a physician's act of discharging her duty to warn would
irreversibly destroy the patient's confidence in the secrecy of the physician-patient
to
relationship.' 8' Refusing to recognize a "dangerous patient" exception, according
182
two.
the
between
confidence
lost
the
revive
not
Judge Kleinfeld, would
Consequently, he concluded that no logical reason existed to believe that refusing

171. Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that the district court erred in allowing the psychotherapist to testify
about the threatening statements that Chase had made during therapy. Id. at 992. Nevertheless, the court affirmed
Chase's conviction because the error was harmless in light of the other evidence showing Chase's guilt. Id. at
992-93.
172. See id. at 995-96.
173. Id. at 995.
174. See id.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See id. at 995-96.
Id. at 996.
Id. at 996-98.
Id. at 996.
Id.
Id. at 996-97.
Id.

182.

Id.
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to recognize the dangerous patient exception would somehow preserve the
physician-patient relationship."8 3
Third, Judge Kleinfeld determined society would pay too great a cost if courts
refused to recognize a "dangerous patient" exception.'8 He acknowledged the
detrimental effects of a "dangerous patient" exception on the therapeutic relationship
between a patient and his physician." 5 But society's interests in protecting the lives
of the patients' victims outweighed concerns about the adverse effects on the
therapeutic relationship.' 86 Moreover, Judge Kleinfeld stated that refusing to
recognize the exception would force victims to incur huge costs to protect themselves, including the legal costs of initiating civil commitment proceedings. 187
Although ultimately rejected by the Ninth Circuit en banc, the considerations
Judge Kleinfeld and others have identified dictate that courts should recognize a
"dangerous patient" exception. In the following section, these considerations and the
arguments in favor and against the exception are further examined.

mI1.

SHOULD COURTS RECOGNIZE A "DANGEROUS
PATIENT" EXCEPTION?
Amid the varying views of if and when a "dangerous patient" exception should
apply lies the fundamental question that must be answered: should courts ever
recognize a "dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases? The Supreme Court of
the United States has seemingly answered this question in the affirmative. 8 Indeed,
the Court had no doubt that situations would arise where "the privilege must give
way.' 89 The Court specifically cited averting threats of harm to patients or others
as precisely such situations."' ° The remainder of this section demonstrates that
existing precedent and society's interest in protecting intended victims both support
a "dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases.
Precedentfrom Other Exceptions Supports Recognizing a "DangerousPatient"
Exception
Courts have already carved out exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege
to protect children or, more generally, to prevent crime and fraud. For example,
in United States v. Burtrum,'9' the Tenth Circuit refused to recognize a

183. Id.
184. Id. at 997.
185. Id.

186. Id.
187. Id. Finally, Judge Kleinfeld cited the ultimate goal of "truth vindication" as a reason to recognize the
"dangerous patient" exception. Id. at 997-98, Judge Kleinfeld observed that Chase's physician had
properly
determined that Chase posed an imminent threat to his intended victims. See id. at 998. As such, Judge
Kleinfeld
concluded that the truth-seeking process outweighed any benefit from preserving the "remaining shreds
of the
confidential therapeutic relationship." Id. at 998.
188. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 17 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1994). The Tenth Circuit decided Burtrum before the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Jaffee. Nothing, however, suggests that Burtrum does not remain good law. To the contrary,
in Glass, the Tenth Circuit cited Burtrum but declined to extend its analysis to cases involving "dangerous patients."
Glass, 133 F.3d at 1359.
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192
psychotherapist-patient privilege in criminal cases involving child sexual abuse.
At least twenty-five states have likewise refused to apply the psychotherapist-patient
93
privilege in cases relating to child abuse.' An exception to the psychotherapistpatient privilege to protect children from abuse shares a common foundation with
the "dangerous patient" exception. Both represent society's interest in protecting
94
innocent victims from grave or serious harm. Both consider disclosure the only
95
way to avert the harm.' Thus, the rationale supporting an exception to protect
children likewise supports an exception to protect against dangerous patients.
Courts have also recognized a crime/fraud exception to the psychotherapistpatient privilege.' 96 In In re Violette, the First Circuit ruled that the psychotherapistpatient privilege does not apply when a patient's "communications are intended
directly to advance a particular criminal or fraudulent endeavor.... "'' The Violette

Hence, Burtrum is distinguishable. First, it was decided before Jaffee and acknowledged the split
in the circuits over recognition of a psychotherapist/client privilege. Second, Burtrum addressed
only the narrow issue whether to recognize the privilege in a criminal child sexual abuse context.
To resolve that question within those contours, we held under a balancing of the need to protect
this vulnerable segment of society, minor victims often intimidated by the legal system and
fearful of testifying, against the quest for relevant evidence in the prosecution of child abuse
cases, "that significant evidentiary need compels the admission of this type of relevant evidence
in child sexual abuse prosecutions...." That is, a subset of the public good, the welfare of
children, presented the sort of situation Jaffee anticipated. However, Burtrum's analysis cannot
be extended here.
Id. (citations omitted).
192. Burtrum, 17 F.3d at 1302. Later, in Glass, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed this rule. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360.
193. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-3283 (West 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-46-107(3) (1995); CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1027 (West 1992); COLO.REv. STAT. § 19-3-304 (Supp. 1995); DEL. R. EviD. 503(d)(4) (Michie 1997);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(c)(G) (1991); IDAHO CODE § 54-3213(3) (1994); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 510(b)(2)(k)
(West 1995); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-121(e)(4) (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A
(West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.623 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02.2(a) (WEST 1988);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-53-29(e) (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-22-401(3) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-711
(1995); NMSA 1978, § 61-31-24(C) (1995); N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 4508(a)(3) (McKinney 1993); OHIOREV. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.02(G)(1)(a) (Anderson 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.250(4) (1991); R.L GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4(b)(4) (1995);
S.D. CODFIED LAWS § 36-26-30(3) (MICHIE 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-23-107(b) (1990); VT. R. EviD. §
503(d)(5) (1994); W. VA. CODE § 30-30-12(a)(4) (1993); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (Michie 1994).
194. Compare Burtrum, 17 F.3d at 1302 (exception to psychotherapist-patient privilege in criminal child
sexual abuse cases protects "vulnerable segment of society" often "intimidated by legal system"), with Jaffee, 518
U.S. at 18 n.19 (stating that situations may arise where privilege must give way "if a serious threat of harm to the
patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist").
195. See Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360 (stating that "dangerous patient" exception applies only where "disclosure
[is] the only means of averting harm to [the victim] when the disclosure was made"); Chase I, 301 F.3d 1019 (en
banc) (indicating that "dangerous patient" exception applies only where psychotherapist "reasonably considered
disclosure to law enforcement authorities to be the only means of averting harm"). Cf.
Criminal child sexual abuse cases illustrate well the policy reasons behind the presumption
against testimonial privileges in criminal cases. These crimes occur in a clandestine manner and
victimize a vulnerable segment of society. Moreover, minor victims often are intimidated by the
legal system and may have difficulty testifying. Thus, these crimes may be difficult to detect and
prosecute. We conclude that significant evidentiary need compels the admission of this type of
relevant evidence in child sexual abuse prosecutions. We decline to recognize a
psychotherapist/client privilege in a criminal child sexual abuse case.
Burtrum, 17 F.3d at 1302 (citations omitted).
196. In re Violette, 183 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 1999).
197. Id. at 77. The First Circuit, however, excluded from this exception confessions of past crimes, because
such confessions assist in the patient's therapy. The court acknowledged that allowing a career criminal to confess
his past crimes in therapy may also have the undesired consequence of increasing the patient's criminal enterprise.
Id.
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court then applied this crime/fraud exception to the statements of the patient,
Gregory P. Violette. t95 Violette had made false statements to two psychotherapists
to defraud disability insurers and moneylenders.' 99 The First Circuit held that the
crime/fraud exception applied to these statements and ordered the psychotherapists
to reveal Violette's false statements. 20° Although implicating distinct policy
rationales, the Violette court's recognition of a crime/fraud exception evidences a
willingness to carve out sound exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Finally, courts recognize an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege
where the patient places her mental health at issue in a lawsuit. For example, in
Sarko v. Penn-DelDirectory Co.,20' a civil plaintiff, K. Sarko, sued her employer for
violating the Americans with Disabilities Act. 20 2 Sarko claimed that she suffered

from clinical depression.2 3 She told her employer of her condition and asked her
employer to make "reasonable accommodation" for this condition. 2° Sarko's
employer, however, refused to do so and later discharged her.20 5
In the resulting lawsuit, the employer sought access to Sarko's medical records
from, among other sources, her primary treating psychiatrist. 20 6 When Sarko refused,
the district court ordered her to produce the records. 2 7 According to the district
court, Sarko had waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege by placing her mental
condition directly at issue in the lawsuit.20 8
These three examples demonstrate that recognizing a "dangerous patient"
exception to prevent harm or injury to third parties does not represent a major
departure from existing precedent. As discussed below, the arguments against
recognizing a "dangerous patient" exception fail to withstand scrutiny.
The Arguments againstRecognizing a "DangerousPatient" Exception Lack
Merit and Fail to Adequately Consider Society's Interest in ProtectingIntended
Victims
Recognizing a "dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases promotes public
safety by protecting intended victims from grave and imminent harm.20 9 Indeed, the
Tenth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit in Chase I, condoned applying the exception in
criminal cases only to prevent imminent harm or injury to third parties. 2'0 However,
opponents of a "dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases dispute whether the
198. Id. at 78.
199. Id.

200. Id.
201. 170 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
202. Id. at 129.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 130-31.
208. Id. at 130.
209. See Wadsworth, supra note 6, at 875 (arguing that courts should recognize dangerous patient exception
to avert serious harm to patient or others).
210. See Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360 (admitting psychotherapist's testimony about patient's threat where
disclosing threat "was the only means of averting harm"); see also Chase 1, 301 F.3d at 1022 (affirming district
court's finding that patient posed "imminent danger" and that disclosing patient's statements made in therapy "was
the only means of averting" danger).
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2 1
exception is necessary to protect against imminent threats of harm. " Instead, they
generally cite three reasons why courts should reject a "dangerous patient"
exception in criminal cases. First, they contend that a psychotherapist's existing duty
to protect potential victims sufficiently neutralizes the threat that the patient poses
to those victims. 2 2 Second, they claim that recognizing the exception would destroy
the "atmosphere of confidence and trust" that exists between a psychotherapist and
not
his patient. 213 Third, opponents argue that the majority of jurisdictions do
2t 4
provide for a "dangerous patient" exception in their evidentiary jurisprudence. As
discussed below, each of these arguments fails to withstand scrutiny.

1. Duty to Protect versus Evidentiary Privilege
Opponents to a "dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases assert that the
2 15
exception fails to achieve its primary goal: protection of intended victims.
According to opponents, the "dangerous patient" exception comes into play only
after one of two events: (1) a patient has attempted to carry out a previously comprotect the
municated threat or (2) the psychotherapist has discharged his duty to subsided.
217
2 6 By that time, however, any imminent danger has
intended victim.
Consequently, allowing a psychotherapist's testimony in a subsequent criminal trial
serves no purpose other than easing the prosecutor's burden to prove a completed
crime. :t8 By contrast, a psychotherapist's existing "duty to protect" intended victims
patient accomplishes the legitimate goal of protecting the potential
from a 2tdangerous
9
victim.

211. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 6, at 52.
The Tarasoffrationale breaks down.. .to justify compelling the therapist to testify to confidential
communications in criminal proceedings against a patient who has carried out or attempted to
carry out a threat. Such after-the-fact testimony is not necessary to protect the victim or potential
victim, and the primary purpose of the proceeding is punishment of the patient rather than
protection of others.
Id. (citations omitted); Nelken, supra note 6, at 38 (noting "important distinction.. .between situations where it is
still possible to avert harm by breaching confidentiality and situations where the psychotherapist testimony can
serve only to further prosecution of the patient").
212. See, e.g., Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584 (psychotherapists' duty under state law to prevent patients from
executing serious and credible threats serves "far more immediate function" than proposed "dangerous patient"
exception).
213. Id. ("[R]ecognition of a 'dangerous patient' exception surely would have a deleterious effect on the
'atmosphere of confidence and trust' in the psychotherapist/patient relationship.").
214. See, e.g., id. at 585 ("The majority of states have no such exception as part of their evidence
jurisprudence; California, alone, has enacted a 'dangerous patient' exception as part of its evidence code which
would arguably apply in a criminal case."); Chase 1H,340 F.3d at 985-86 (noting that California is the only state
in the Ninth Circuit to recognize evidentiary "dangerous patient" exception and stating, "almost all the states, then,
recognize the distinction between confidentiality (which is affected by the Tarasoff duty) and testimonial privilege
(which is not)").
215. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 6, at 52 ("Such after-the-fact testimony is not necessary to protect the victim
or potential victim... .The social utility of the therapist's testimony in a criminal proceeding against the patient
simply does not compare to the social utility of a Tarasoffwarning.") (citations omitted).
216. Id.
217. Id.; see also Chase 11, 340 F.3d at 987 ("If a patient was dangerous at the time of the Tarasoffdisclosure,
but by the time of trial the patient is stable and harmless, the protection rationale that animates the exception to the
states' confidentiality laws no longer applies.").
218. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 6, at 52.
219. See Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584 ("State law requirements that psychotherapists take action to prevent serious
and credible threats from being carried out serve a far more immediate function than the proposed 'dangerous
patient' exception."); see also Chase 11, 340 F.3d at 987.
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The psychotherapist's "duty to protect" traces back to the California Supreme
220
Court's landmark decision in Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of California.
There, the California Supreme Court held a psychotherapist must protect third
parties from threats of serious danger that a patient under the psychotherapist's care
poses.22' In Tarasoff,Porsenjit Poddar, a student at the University of California at
Berkeley, shot and stabbed to death Tatiana Tarasoff. 22" About two months before
the murder, Poddar had received therapy on an outpatient basis from Dr. Lawrence
Moore, a psychologist for the Cowell Memorial Hospital at the University of
California at Berkeley.2 23 During a session with Dr. Moore, Poddar announced that
he planned to kill Tarasoff when she returned from vacation. 22 4After consulting with
two colleagues, Dr. Moore decided to commit Poddar for observation and called
Berkeley campus police to assist him in confining Poddar. 25 Shortly thereafter,
campus police took Poddar into custody and questioned him about Tarasoff. 226
Poddar convinced campus police that he posed no threat and promised to stay away
from Tarasoff. 2 27 Based on this assurance, campus police released Poddar.2 28 Neither
Dr. Moore nor campus police relayed Poddar's threats to Tarasoff or any of her
relatives. 229 Less than two months later, Poddar brutally murdered Tarasoff. 2 °
In a subsequent lawsuit, the California Supreme Court found the "special
relationship" between a psychotherapist and his patient placed certain obligations
on the psychotherapist.23 ' Specifically, the relationship obliged the psychotherapist
to anticipate the patient's potential for violence and to protect the intended victim:
When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession
should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to
another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended
victim against such danger.232

The Tarasoffduty is justified on the
the existence of a dangerous patient
effect on the psychotherapist-patient
criminal trial focuses on establishing
the goals of protection and proof.

ground of protection; the societal benefit from disclosing
out-weighs the private and public cost of the deleterious
relationship. By contrast, ordinarily testimony at a later
a past act. There is not necessarily a connection between

Id.
220. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). The California Supreme Court initially held that psychotherapists owe a duty
to warn third parties of potential threats from patients under their care. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California,529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974). Subsequently, the California Supreme Court vacated that decision and reheard
the case. In the resulting opinion, the court enunciated a duty to protect. Tarasoff,551 P.2d at 345.
221. Tarasoff,551 P.2d at 345.
222. See also People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 344 (Cal. 1974) (reversing Poddar's original conviction for
second degree murder for failure to give adequate instructions concerning a defense of diminished capacity)
(superceded by statute as stated in People v. Bobo, 518 P.2d 342 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 1990)).
223. Tarasoff,551 P.2d at 339.
224. Id. at 341. Poddar did not mention Tarasoff's name, but it appears that Dr. Moore readily identified the
victim as Tarasoff.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 433.
230. Id.
231. Id. at443.
232. Id. at 431.
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Opponents to a "dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases criticize courts
33
for equating the Tarasoff duty to protect with the "dangerous patient" exception.
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit in Chase II, asserted that little or no
connection exists between the two.234 The Sixth Circuit assumed that, once the
psychotherapist discharges his Tarasoff duty, the patient will be less likely to carry
out his threat.235 Admitting the psychotherapist's testimony at a subsequent criminal
proceeding would, therefore, serve no protective function.236
Similarly, Professor George C. Harris posits that courts should recognize a
"dangerous patient" exception only to prevent future harm to victims.237 Professor
Harris would apply the exception solely in civil commitment and restraining order
proceedings.238 Like the Sixth Circuit, Professor Harris necessarily assumes that the
psychotherapist can eliminate the threat by initiating civil commitment proceedings
against the patient. 239 Alternatively, the victim can eliminate the threat by obtaining
a restraining order against the patient. 4 In any event, advocates of these views
believe that criminal proceedings are unnecessary to protect intended victims from
the danger posed by a dangerous patient.

233. See Nelken, supra note 6, at 35-37; see also Harris, supra note 6, at 49-57.
234. See Hayes, 227 F.3d at 583-84.
We see only a marginal connection, if any at all, between a psychotherapist's action in notifying
a third party (for his own safety) of a patient's threat to kill or injure him and a court's refusal
to permit the therapist to testify about such threat (in the interest of protecting the
psychotherapist/patient relationship) in a later prosecution of the patient for making it.
Id.; see also Chase 11, 340 F.3d at 987 ("[A]nalytically there is little connection between a psychotherapist's stateimposed obligation to report a dangerous patient at the time the patient makes a threat, on the one hand, and the later
operation of the federal testimonial privilege, on the other."); Harris, supra note 6, at 52 ("The social utility of the
therapist's testimony in a criminal proceeding against the patient simply does not compare to the social utility of
a Tarasoffwarning.").
235. See Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584 ("Unlike the situation presented in Tarasoff, the threat articulated by a
defendant such as Hayes is rather unlikely to be carried out once court proceedings have begun against him.").
236. See id.
237. Harris, supra note 6, at 33 ("Whether or not a Tarasoff duty to protect existed at an earlier time,
exception to the evidentiary privilege should be made only where psychotherapists' testimony is necessary to
prevent future harm to patients or identified potential victims.").
238. Id. at 67.
239. Id.
Exception to the evidentiary privilege is justified for testimony in a restraining order proceeding
or in a proceeding to hospitalize the patient, the purposes of which are to protect the potential
victims, the patient, or the public. No similar justification exists, however, for compelling a
therapist to testify against her patient in a criminal proceeding after the threat of harm has been
carried out or is no longer viable.
Id.
240. Id. at 33.
[E]xception to the evidentiary privilege should be made only where psychotherapists' testimony
is necessary to prevent future harm to patients or identified potential victims. Applying this
standard, the dangerous patient exception generally would not apply in criminal actions against
patients, but would apply only in proceedings for the purpose of protecting patients or third
parties, such as restraining order hearings or proceedings to hospitalize patients.
Id.; Hayes, 227 F.3d at 585 ("We think the Jaffee footnote was referring to the fact that psychotherapists will
sometimes need to testify in court proceedings, such as those for the involuntary commitment of a patient, to comply
with their 'duty to protect' the patient or identifiable third parties."); Nelken, supra note 6, at 36-37 ("The
dangerous-patient evidentiary exception should be limited.. to situations in which disclosure is necessary to prevent
harm to others, such as hospitalization proceedings or proceedings to obtain a restraining order.").

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

These assumptions, however, fail for two reasons. First, civil commitments and
restraining orders, by their nature, are temporary.2 4 ' Thus, to ensure her safety, the
intended victim would have to seek continuing assistance from the courts and legal
system, thereby incurring commensurate legal costs. 2 42 Moreover, the intended
victim would be required to continually prove that the patient poses an imminent
threat of harm.2 43 That task will prove difficult once the psychotherapist breaks confidence and fulfills his Tarasoffduty. Thereafter, the patient will no longer feel he
can freely disclose incriminating information to his psychotherapist. 244 Absent the
psychotherapist's testimony, a court will be less inclined to find an imminent threat
of harm. Consequently, the victim will have little or no recourse in the face of
danger.
Second, these assumptions ignore the on-going risk of harm that disturbed
individuals pose to their intended victims. For example, assume that a psychotherapist concludes that his patient poses a significant risk of harm to an intended victim.
He then discharges his Tarasoff duty and informs the victim of the threat. In
response, the victim applies for a temporary restraining order against the patient,
believing it will remove the threat that the patient poses to her. But initiating legal
proceedings only strengthens the patient's resolve to carry out his threats. Indeed,
recent data indicates that restraining orders may actually incite violence against the
victim.24 Thus, instead of protecting the victim, instituting civil proceedings

241. A civil commitment proceeding is an action to involuntarily commit or detain in a suitable facility, such
as a mental health hospital, an individual considered to be mentally ill and dangerous. See 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally
Impaired Persons §§ 7, 14 (2003). Typically, the committed individual remains in custody until such time as the
individual's release would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious danger to the
property of another. Id. § 7. Persons subject to involuntary civil commitment are entitled to periodic review of their
commitments. Id. § 26. A temporary restraining order is "an extraordinary remedy" that may be granted to restrain
specified conduct and that requires imminent and irreparable injury. See 13 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, §§ 65.31, 65.32, 65-80; 65.60[3] (3d ed. 2003). Temporary restraining orders
typically may not exceed ten days in duration. Id. § 65.38. ("[Even i]f the order does not contain an expiration date,
it automatically expires 10 days after it has been entered by the court."); see also 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 293
(2003) (under state statutes similar or identical to federal rule, temporary restraining order is invalid if expiration
date exceeds 10 days after issuance).
242. See, e.g., Chase 11,340 F.3d at 997 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (arguing that refusing to recognize
"dangerous patient" exception results in unreasonable costs to threatened individual and stating, "How shall the
threatened individual assemble the money for lawyers and experts and persuade the involved bureaucracies and
individuals to act fast enough to prevent realization of the threat?").
243. Issuance of a temporary restraining order or other injunctive relief requires showing of "imminent" and
"irreparable" harm. See 13 MOORE ET AL., supra note 241, §§ 65.31, 65.32, 65.60[3].
244. See L.R.Wulsin et al., Unexpected ClinicalFeaturesof the Tarasoff Decision: The TherapeuticAlliance
and the "Duty to Warn," 1983 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 140, 602 ("Given that trust is the sine qua non of the therapistpatient relationship and that confidentiality is the mechanism for protecting that trust, only rarely can the therapist
breach the patient's confidence without losing the patient's trust.").
245.

See STALKING CRIMES AND VICTIM PROTECTION, PREVENTION, INTERVENTION, THREAT ASSESSMENT,

AND CASE MANAGEMENT 364, 512 (Joseph A. Davis ed., 2001) ("The TRO may escalate the situation and may
trigger a violent response by the stalker. It is recognized that restraining orders may not be effective in actually
protecting a victim and may instead 'provoke' the stalker."); see also Gerald McOscar, Restraining Orders May
Incite Domestic Violence, available at http:llfatherless.netlfv/n1980103.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2004) ("[M]any
women are unwittingly discovering that taking out a protection order against their husbands and lovers may actually
incite violence-sometimes with tragic consequences."); Callie Anderson Marks, The Kansas Stalking Law: A
"Credible Threat" to Victims. A Critique of the Proposed Kansas Stalking Law and Proposed Legislation, 36
WASHBURN L.J. 468 (1997) (stating that obtaining restraining order may provoke violence) (citing KAREN PARRISH
ET AL., STALKED!: BREAKING THE SILENCE ON THE CRIME EPIDEMIC OF THE NINETIES 9 (1995)); EVE S. BUZAWA
& CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 200-03 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing
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against a dangerous patient may actually place the intended victim in greater
danger.
Moreover, even if the intended victim obtains a valid restraining order, as
Professor Harris suggests, 246 the patient can simply disregard the order. Research
shows that restraining orders do not prevent subsequent violations of the initial
order.247 In fact, the restrained party violates the restraining order through some form
of contact with the victim in about fifty percent of all cases. 248 Even worse, the
patient may have already attempted to carry out his threat against the intended
victim by the time she applies for the restraining order. Either way, a patient who
repeatedly threatens another's life exhibits a disregard for both the law and the
consequences attendant to criminal action. Yet, commentators necessarily assume
that commencing civil proceedings will adequately protect intended victims from
such dangerous individuals.249 Common sense and experience dictate otherwise.25 °
The facts of Tarasoffillustrate this point. In Tarasoff,a physician recognized that
his patient, Poddar, presented a serious risk of injury to a third party and told law
enforcement officers of this threat.2 5' Moreover, police officers confronted Poddar
with the information that they had learned from his psychologist and demanded that
he stay away from his intended victim. 252 Indeed, they even took him into custody
and released him only after he promised the officers that he would, in fact, leave
Tarasoff alone. 253 Nevertheless, Poddar methodically planned for two months to get
close to Tarasoff and eventually killed her.254
Although Tarasoff never obtained a restraining order, or a warning for that
matter, the facts suggest that a restraining order would have made little, if any,
difference. A restraining order is effective only when the restrained party agrees to
abide by its terms. As discussed above, a party subject to a restraining order is likely
to disregard the order in one way or another. Presumably, Poddar would have done

general ineffectiveness of protection orders to prevent future harm to victims).
246. See Harris, supra note 6, at 63.
247.

See STALKING CRIMES AND VICTIM PROTECTION, PREVENTION, INTERVENTION, THREAT ASSESSMENT,

AND CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 245 ("The research to date has generally shown that restraining orders in
general do not prevent subsequent violation of the order.").
248. See id. ("[I]n about half or more of cases in which a restraining order is in effect, the order is
subsequently violated through some form of contact by the restrained party."); see also Betsy Thai, The Trend
Toward SpecializationDomestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.

1285, 1292 (2000) (stating that studies show that "almost 50% of court-issued protection orders were violated within
two years") (citing Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 10 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds.,
1996)).
249. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 6, at 67.
250. See STALKING CRIMES AND VICTIM PROTECTION, PREVENTION, INTERVENTION, THREAT ASSESSMENT,
AND CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 245, at 512 ("The TRO may escalate the situation and may trigger a violent
response by the stalker... .It is recognized that restraining orders may not be effective in actually protecting a victim
and may instead 'provoke' the stalker."); see also McOscar supra note 245 ("[M]any women are unwittingly
discovering that taking out a protection order against their husbands and lovers may actually incite
violence-sometimes with tragic consequences.").
251. Tarasoff,551 P.2d at 341.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Alan A. Stone, The TarasoffDecisions: Suing Psychotherapiststo Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV.
258, 360 (1976) ("While Tatiana Tarasoff was out of the country during the summer, Poddar broke his promise to
the police and established a relationship with her brother, who, not having been warned, was unaware of the danger
Poddar posed.").
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so if Tarasoff had successfully obtained a restraining order against him. Indeed,
police had already detained Poddar, and he had already promised to stay away from
Tarasoff.255 Since this failed to deter Poddar, there is no reason to believe that a
restraining order, the strength of which depended on Poddar' s willingness to abide
by it, would have actually restrained him.
To be sure, the facts of Tarasoff demonstrate that the intended victim's safety
requires the psychotherapist's testimony in a criminal proceeding. Absent that
testimony, the prosecution will not be able to prove that the patient made terrorist
threats against the intended victim. 25 6 Consequently, the victim, even if made aware
of the risk posed by a dangerous patient, will never feel secure. Opponents, anticipating this argument, maintain that obtaining convictions can never justify a
"dangerous patient" exception. 257 But this misses the point. As the tragic circumstances of Tarasoffdemonstrate, protecting the intended victim from ongoing threats
of harn-not obtaining convictions-necessitates the exception.
2. Effect on the Atmosphere of Confidence and Trust
In Jaffee, the Supreme Court of the United States declared that "effective psychotherapy... depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient
is willing to make frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and
fears."25' 8 Likewise, commentators note that psychotherapists have a unique need to
ensure confidentiality:
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain confidentiality. His capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon their
willingness and ability to talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for
him to function without being able to assure his patients of confidentiality and,

255. Tarasoff,551 P.2d. at 341.
256. As discussed in section M11,
the proposed framework for allowing psychotherapist-testimony requires that
the psychotherapist explicitly warn the patient that he will not keep confidential, in any manner, threats that the
patient makes towards others. In Chase II, the Ninth Circuit stated that, in the ordinary case, other evidence besides
a physician's testimony usually will exist to show the patient's guilt. 340 F.3d 978. Notably, the Ninth Circuit cited
no authority for this proposition. Moreover, the facts of both Hayes and Glass suggest that the opposite is true.
257. For example, Professor Harris argues that criminal proceedings, as opposed to civil proceedings, have
no relationship to protecting victims and potential victims. Thus, he sees no reason to extend the rationale behind
Tarasoffto allow a psychotherapist to testify against his or her client in a criminal proceeding. Harris, supra note
6, at 52-53.
The Tarasoffrationale breaks down, however, when it is used, as in Menendez and Wharton and
as apparently contemplated by Jaffee, to justify compelling the therapist to testify to confidential
communications in criminal proceedings against a patient who has carried out or attempted to
carry out a threat. Such after-the-fact testimony is not necessary to protect the victim or potential
victim, and the primary purpose of the proceeding is punishment of the patient rather than
protection of others. The social utility of the therapist's testimony in a criminal proceeding
against the patient simply does not compare to the social utility of a Tarasoff warning ....
Any
argument based on the importance of obtaining convictions in cases involving violent crimes is
not, in any event, based on the protective rationale of the Tarasoffduty unless the proceeding
is one that will result in affirmative steps to protect an identifiable potential victim.
Id. (citations omitted); Nelken, supra note 6, at 35-36.
258. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10-11.
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indeed, privileged communication. A threat to secrecy blocks successful
treatment.259

Opponents to the "dangerous patient" exception claim that the exception creates
just such a threat to secrecy. 2" In Hayes, for instance, the Sixth Circuit cited the
effect upon the "atmosphere of confidence and trust" as the primary reason to reject
" ' The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that
a criminal "dangerous patient" exception.26
the psychotherapist's existing duty to protect negatively impacts the psychotherapist-patient relationship.2"2 But a warning that the psychotherapist may later reveal
the patient's statements in a criminal proceeding would irreparably harm the fragile
relationship:
While early advice to the patient that, in the event of the disclosure of a serious
threat of harm to an identifiable victim, the therapist will have a duty to protect
the intended victim, may have a marginal effect on a patient's candor in therapy
sessions, an additional warning that the patient's statements may be used against
him in a subsequent criminal prosecution would certainly chill and very likely
terminate open dialogue.263

Professor Harris predicts similar consequences to the psychotherapist-patient
relationship if courts require psychotherapists to warn their patients that they may
later divulge their patient's statements in criminal proceedings. 26' Nevertheless, both
the Sixth Circuit and Professor Harris would allow a psychotherapist to testify
against his patient in involuntary hospitalization or restraining order proceedings. 65
Likewise, in Chase II the Ninth Circuit stated that it would allow a psychotherapist
to testify about his patient's statements in civil commitment proceedings. 266 These

259. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 98.
260. See, e.g., Harris,supra note 6, at 57; Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584-85.
261. See Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584-85; see also Chase 11, 340 F.3d at 991 ("A criminal conviction with the help
of a psychotherapist's testimony is almost sure to spell the end of any patient's willingness to undergo further
treatment for mental health problems.").
262. See Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584-85.
263. Id.
264. See Harris, supra note 6, at 56.
On the one hand there would be what has presumably become a commonplace of ethical
disclosure, a Tarasoffwarningthat, while the patient's communications will be generally kept
in strictest confidence, there could be circumstances under which the therapist would have a duty
to reveal those confidences to the extent necessary to protect the patient or another person. On
the other hand, if exception to the evidentiary privilege is coupled with the Tarasoffduty, one
can imagine a quite different and more chilling warning: "while our conversations will generally
be kept in confidence, you should know that, if you reveal to me an intention to harm another
person, I may have a duty to take steps to protect that person and might also be forced to testify
in later court proceedings to what you said." Commentators from the psychotherapeutic
community, not surprisingly, find a substantial difference in those two scenarios.
Id.; Nelken, supra note 6, at 34-36 (concurring with the Sixth Circuit's assumption that recognizing "dangerous
patient" exception would have a "deleterious effect" on the psychotherapist-patient relationship). Cf. Chase II, 340
F.3d at 988 n.5 (suggesting that a court would properly apply "dangerous patient" exception where physician
actually informs patient that physician could testify in subsequent criminal proceeding).
265. See Hayes, 227 F.3d at 585 (permitting psychotherapist to testify to his patient's confidential statements
in involuntary commitment of patient proceedings); see also Harris, supra note 6, at 63 (advocating that courts
permit psychologists to testify about their patients' confidential statements only at restraining order proceedings
and involuntary hospitalization of patient proceedings).
266. See Chase I1, 340 F.3d at 988.
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proceedings, according to the Sixth Circuit and Professor Harris, will likely improve
the patient's health while preserving the physician-patient relationship:
After involuntary hospitalization, for example, the patient would no longer pose
a "serious threat of harm" to anyone and, hopefully, the psychotherapist/patient
relationship can continue during the patient's hospitalization. While that patient,
by definition, will initially reject the prospect of hospitalization, it may
ultimately improve his mental state and should not leave a stigma after the stay
concludes.267

In contrast, the delicate psychotherapist-patient relationship cannot, according to the
Sixth Circuit and Professor Harris, withstand the same testimony at a criminal
proceeding. 68
However, this underestimates the effects of allowing a psychotherapist to testify
against his patient at a civil proceeding. No reason exists to believe that a psychotherapist's testimony at a civil hearing will have a less damaging effect on the therapeutic process than the same testimony at a criminal hearing. On the contrary, both
carry the same potential to destroy the atmosphere of confidence and trust underlying the psychotherapist-patient privilege.269 Consider the following hypothetical
example. During several therapy sessions with his psychotherapist, a patient makes
repeated and credible threats against a specific individual. He also takes other steps
that objectively indicate that he is likely to carry out his threats. In response, the
psychotherapist reminds the patient that he has a duty to disclose the patient's
threats to the intended victim and law enforcement. The psychotherapist then
informs the intended victim and law enforcement officers of the danger that the
patient poses. Next, either the psychotherapist moves to civilly commit the patient
or the intended victim applies for a restraining order.
At the subsequent hearing in this hypothetical situation, the psychotherapist
testifies about the threatening statements that the patient made during the therapy
sessions. He also testifies that he believes the patient poses a substantial risk of
imminent harm to the intended victim. All the while, the patient sits in court
watching his psychotherapist reveal the patient's confidential statements. Depending
on the nature of that hearing, the patient is either involuntarily hospitalized or
restrained from his intended victim. Either way, the psychotherapist will have
breached the patient's confidence and engendered a sense of betrayal in the patient.
The patient's resulting anger and alienation would
surely destroy any trust or
2 70
confidence that he once had in his psychotherapist.

267. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 585.
268. See id.
269. See Wulsin et al., supra note 244, at 602 ("Given that trust is the sine qua non of the therapist-patient
relationship and that confidentiality is the mechanism for protecting that trust, only rarely can the therapist breach
the patient's confidence without losing the patient's trust.").
270. In Chase II, Judge Kleinfeld predicted that the patient would experience the same anger and alienation
when his psychotherapist discharged her duty to warn the patient's intended victims. Chase II, 340 F.3d at 997
(Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
Once the person the deranged individual hates so much that he plans to kill him knows his
secrets, and the deranged individual knows that his psychotherapist refuses to keep his secrets
from that person, there is not much therapeutic value in refusing later to tell this alreadydisclosed information to the judge and jury. After all, the deranged person does not hate them
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The psychotherapist, of course, could have preserved the "atmosphere of
confidence and trust" by refusing to testify at the civil commitment or restraining
order hearing. But without his testimony, the intended victim would remain at risk.
Even if a restraining order were issued, there is no guarantee that it will ensure the
victim's safety-a questionable assumption at best. Thus, the objective observer
must decide whose interest society should protect: the patient's interest in becoming
a functioning member of society or the intended victim's interest in protecting her
life. Clearly, the latter outweighs the former.
Even commentators opposed to recognizing a "dangerous patient" exception in
criminal cases condone the exception in civil commitment or restraining order proceedings.271 But as shown above, the psychotherapist's testimony in civil proceedings is just as likely to destroy the "atmosphere of confidence and trust" between the
psychotherapist and the patient. Thus,. a model allowing a "dangerous patient"
exception in civil proceedings, but prohibiting it in criminal proceedings, defies
common sense. Realistically, a psychotherapist's testimony against his patient in
either setting will negatively impact the "atmosphere of confidence and trust." Only
an outright ban on psychotherapist testimony will preserve the "atmosphere of
confidence and trust" underlying the psychotherapist-patient relationship. An outright ban, however, would sacrifice the safety of the intended victim for the health
of the patient in every instance. Presumably, the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized the need for a "dangerous patient" exception to avoid such a result.272
Anticipating this argument, opponents blur the issue by comparing the "dangerous patient" exception to the psychotherapist's duty to protect. For example,
Professor Harris concedes that a psychotherapist's ethical obligation to inform the
patient of the psychotherapist's duty to protect has adverse effects on the
psychotherapist-patient relationship.2 73 He argues that warning the patient that the
psychotherapist may have to testify about the patient's statements in criminal
proceedings would likely cause irreparable damage to the relationship.2 74 To support
this claim, Professor Harris cites two studies2 75 suggesting that physicians believe

and his confidentiality is long gone. The majority is evidently concerned about deranged
murderous individuals stopping valuable therapy because the psychotherapist reveals their
confidences. But where that will occur, it will doubtless already have occurred where the
psychotherapist betrayed their confidences to their worst enemies.
Id.
271. See Hayes, 227 F.3d at 585 (permitting psychotherapist to testify to his patient's confidential statements
in involuntary commitment of patient proceedings); Harris, supra note 6, at 63 (advocating that courts permit
psychologists to testify about their patient's confidential statements only at restraining order proceedings and
involuntary hospitalization of patient proceedings).
272. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19.
273. Harris, supra note 6, at 55-56 (noting that ethical duty to inform patient of Tarasoffduty has chilling
effect on psychotherapist-patient relationship).
274. Id. at 56-57.
275. Readers should note that, when the California Supreme Court decided Tarasoff,commentators forecasted
similar dire consequences to those predicted in the studies that Harris cites. Cf. Catherine Thompson Dobrowitsky,
In Light of Reason and Experience: Against a Crime FraudException to the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege,35
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 621, 631 n.67 (citing Toni Pryor Wise, Note, Where the Public PerilBegins: A Survey of

Psychotherapiststo Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165, 177 (1978) (stating that, after the
second Tarasoff ruling, one-fourth of 1272 psychotherapists "reported observing in their patients some reluctance
to discuss their violent tendencies when the patients learned that the therapist might in some circumstances breach
confidentiality")); Stone, supra note 254, at 369 n.52 ("violent thoughts and ideas are not uncommon among
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a psychotherapist's testimony in a criminal proceeding would destroy the therapeutic
process.276 Of these two studies, only one addresses the "dangerous patient"
exception.27 7
Professor Harris's reliance on this study is misplaced for three reasons. First, the
study upon which Professor Harris relies only addresses situations where the
"danger has dissipated. 278 But, as discussed above, danger has not truly dissipated
until the intended victim is removed from harm's way.279 Oftentimes this requires
more than the commencement of civil proceedings." Second, Professor Harris
ignores the effect of a psychotherapist's testimony at a civil proceeding. Indeed, the
study that Professor Harris cites does not distinguish between civil and criminal
proceedings.2"' Moreover, as demonstrated above, testimony at a civil proceeding
is just as likely to damage the psychotherapist-patient relationship as the same
testimony at a criminal proceeding. Third, even under Professor Harris's model,
psychotherapists would have to disclose the possibility they might have to testify
against their patients at civil commitment and restraining order hearings. Thus, even
under Professor Harris's model, psychotherapists would have to provide the precise
warning that Professor Harris disapproves:
while our conversations will generally be kept in confidence, you should know
that, if you reveal to me an intention to harm another person, I may have to take
steps to protect that person and might also be forced to testify in later court
proceedings to what you said.282
The difference between this warning and a warning that specifically identifies
criminal proceedings is negligible at best.28 3 Protecting intended victims undoubtedly justifies such a difference, assuming any exists at all.

patients coming to psychotherapy; such a Miranda-typewarning would chill all such dialogue"); Tarasoff,551 P.2d
at 346 n. 12 ("Counsel for defendants Regents and amicus American Psychiatric predict that a decision of this court
holding that a therapist may bear a duty to protect a potential victim will deter violence-prone persons from seeking
therapy, and hamper the treatment of other patients."). Not surprisingly, these speculative arguments failed to
persuade the California Supreme Court. See id. Subsequent studies suggest that the Tarasoffduty positively affected
the therapeutic process. See Wulsin et al., supra note 244, at 601-03 (arguing that therapist's duty to victim and
therapeutic duty to patient produce synergistic effect of enhancing patient's capacity to make choices); see also
David B. Wexler, Patients,Therapists, and Third Parties: The Victimological Virtues of Tarasoff, 2 INT. J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 1 (1979) ("A Tarasoff-type obligation [may prompt] a paradigmatic (or at least pragmatic) shift in the
treatment of interpersonal violence... In terms of its overall impact, then, Tarasoff may help rather than hinder
therapy."); M.J. Mills et al., Protecting Third Parties:A Decade after Tarasoff, 144 Am.J. PSYCHIATRY 68, 72
(1987) ("One cannot assume.. .that warning a third party is inevitably counterproductive. Sometimes the duty to
warn can be viewed as another available therapeutic option apart from its being a legal requirement.").
276. See Harris, supra note 6, at 55-56 n.104.
277. See Gregory B. Leong et al., The Psychotherapistas a Wimess for the Prosecution:The Criminalization
of Tarasoff, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 101 (1992).
278. Harris, supra note 6, at 56 n.104.
279. See supra pp. 118-20.
280. See supra pp. 119-20.
281. See Leong et al., supra note 277, at 1101.
282. Harris, supra note 6, at 56.
283. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Chase 11seemingly breaks rank with Professor Harris on this point. In
Chase 11, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the "dangerous patient" exception would apply where the physician warns
the patient that the physician might testify about the patient's threatening statements in a criminal proceeding. 340
F.3d at 988 n.5.
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3. The Majority of JurisdictionsDo Not Providefor a "DangerousPatient"
Exception
Courts that refuse to apply the "dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases
consistently note that most states do not provide for an analogous exception. For
example, the Sixth Circuit observed that only California explicitly recognizes such
an exception."s In contrast, the vast majority of states have "no such exception as
' The Ninth Circuit, in Chase II, also found
part of their evidence jurisprudence."285
this fact significant in analyzing the states' experience with the psychotherapistpatient privilege.286
This simplistic argument, however, applies nearly every time a court decides a
novel issue of law. Indeed, opponents to the Tarasoff duty made an identical
argument when the California Supreme Court considered whether a psychotherapist
owes a duty to protect.287 At that time, California stood alone in recognizing such
a duty.288 Today, the vast majority of states require psychotherapists to protect
victims against dangerous patients under the psychotherapist's care.28 9 Moreover,
commentators have suggested that at least twenty-nine states implicitly support a
"dangerous patient" exception to prevent serious threats of harm.290
In sum, no logical reason exists to prohibit a "dangerous patient" exception in
criminal cases but allow it in civil proceedings. As such, the exception should apply
in both settings. The remainder of this article proposes a four-part test for courts to
follow in determining when the exception should apply in criminal cases.
IV. A WORKABLE FRAMEWORK TO APPLY THE DANGEROUS
PATIENT EXCEPTION IN CRIMINAL CASES
The protection of intended victims compels a "dangerous patient" exception to
the psychotherapist-patient privilege in criminal cases. 29' The question remains,
however, under what circumstances should courts allow psychotherapists to testify
about their patients' confidential statements? Thus far, two circuits have attempted
to answer this question.29 2 Neither has provided a satisfactory framework for courts
to follow in future cases. For example, neither circuit has defined the limits to which
a psychotherapist can testify concerning his patient's statements. 293 Likewise, neither
circuit has definitively settled whether a psychotherapist's subjective belief that his
patient poses a threat of imminent harm alone triggers the exception.294 This section,

284.
285.
286.
287.

288.
California
289.
290.

See Hayes, 227 F.3d at 585.
Id.
Chase II, 340 F.3d at 985.
See, e.g., Wadsworth, supra note 6, at 877.

See Hayes, 227 F.3d at 583 (stating that imposition of psychotherapist's duty to protect began with
Supreme Court's decision in Tarasoff).
See Harris, supra note 6, at 47.
See Wadsworth, supra note 6, at 887.

291. See supra Part I.
292. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360; Chase!, 301 F.3d at 1024.

293. See Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360; Chase , 301 F.3d at 1024 (failing to define limits of proposed testimony).
294. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360 (failing to discuss whether psychotherapist's belief that patient poses threat of
imminent harm must be objective or subjective); Chase 1, 301 F.3d at 1025 (stating that psychotherapist's subjective
belief of imminent harm "may" be sufficient to trigger "dangerous patient" exception).
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therefore, proposes a workable framework under which courts may apply a
"dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases.
As explained below, courts should allow psychotherapists to testify about their
patients' otherwise confidential statements when the following four elements are
met: (1) the patient threatens a specific individual or individuals or the psychotherapist can readily identify the individual or individuals threatened, (2) the psychotherapist objectively believes that the patient poses an imminent threat of injury to such
individual or individuals, (3) the psychotherapist explicitly warns the patient that he
will not keep confidential any threatening statements the patient makes against a
particular individual or individuals for any purpose, and (4) the psychotherapist
possesses no reasonable way to prevent harm or injury to the threatened individual
or individuals. Even if these elements are met, courts should strictly limit the
statements to which the psychotherapist may testify.
As shown below, this framework strikes the appropriate balance between two
often competing interests: the patient's interest in obtaining unfettered mental health
treatment and society's interest in protecting intended victims. Critics may argue
that the Jaffee Court explicitly rejected balancing of interests in annunciating the
psychotherapist-patient privilege and, thus, Jaffee prohibits any balancing to determine whether a patient's statements are privileged. 295 However, Jaffee prohibited
only balancing the probative value of the evidence against the patient's privacy
interests in his statements.296 At no point did the Jaffee Court reject all balancing.29 7
On the contrary, in footnote nineteen, the Court endorsed balancing competing
29
interests to determine whether an exception to the privilege should exist.
Specifically, the Court stated society's interests in protecting its citizenry could
outweigh a patient's privacy interests in shielding his confidential statements from
disclosure.299 Moreover, subsequent courts addressing the "dangerous patient"
exception have explicitly balanced society's interest in protecting third parties with
the patient's interest in preserving a therapeutic relationship with his physician."°'
Courts, therefore, should consider these competing interests and apply the following
test to strike the appropriate balance between them.

295. See Harris, supra note 6, at 56 (concluding that arguments supporting dangerous patient exception that
turn on "fact specific, case-by-case balancing of the value of therapeutic confidence against evidentiary truthfinding" contradict Jaffee's rejection of balancing approach); see also Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17.
We reject the balancing component of the privilege implemented by [the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals] and a small number of states. Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon
a trial judge's later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient's interest in privacy and
the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege.
Id.
296. Jaffe, 518 U.S. at 17-18.
297. Id. at 18 n. 19 (endorsing balancing to determine whether exception to privilege should exist).
298. See Alexandra P. West, Implying Plaintiff'sWaivers of the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilegeafterJaffee
v. Redmond, 59 U. Prr. L. REV. 901, 904-05 (1998) ("It is true that the question of whether a privilege has been
waived is a separate inquiry from the initial question of whether the communication was privileged. The Court's
no-balancing prohibition applies only to the determination of whether a particular communication is privileged.").
299. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19.
300. See, e.g., Hayes, 227 F.3d at 585; see also Chase I, 340 F.3d at 990-92.
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1. Specific Victim or Victims
Protecting potential victims provides the strongest reason to recognize a
1
"dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases." Consequently, logic dictates that
courts should apply the exception only where the patient has targeted a specific
individual or individuals. Of course, a patient's failure to specifically name a particular individual should not automatically preclude courts from applying the exception. Rather, courts should apply the exception if the psychotherapist can readily
30 2
identify the individual or individuals threatened. Unless it is known who is at risk,
it is unlikely that a psychotherapist's testimony will serve the fundamental purpose
of the "dangerous patient" exception: namely, to protect third parties from imminent
and on-going harm or injury. Not surprisingly, a parallel limitation on the psychotherapist's duty to protect exists in most states that have adopted California's Tarasoff
duty.303
2. Threat of Imminent Harm or Injury
In order to prevent the exception from swallowing the rule, any workable test
must require an objective threat of imminent harm to a third party. Indeed, both
courts that have applied the exception to date have stressed the imminent risk of
harm the patient must pose to his intended victim. For example, the Tenth Circuit
would apply the "dangerous patient" exception only when the psychotherapist
3°4
believes that the patient poses a risk of imminent harm. Likewise, in Chase I, the
30 5
Ninth Circuit announced the same general rule. To be sure, the importance of
recognizing an exception to an evidentiary privilege necessitates such a require-

301. See Harris, supra note 6, at 53-54.
Any argument [in favor of a "dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases] based on the
importance of obtaining convictions in cases involving crimes is not, in any event, based on the
protective rationale of the Tarasoff duty unless the proceeding is one that will result in
affirmative steps to protect an identifiable victim.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Lynda Womack Kennedy, Role of Jaffee v. Redmond's "Course of Diagnosis or
Privilege,35 GA. L. REV. 345,368 (2000)
Treatment" Conditionin PreventingAbuse ofthe Psychotherapist-Patient
("The adoption of a dangerous-patient exception would indicate.. that society and the courts place the dangerouspatient rationale-'the public interest in safety from violent assault'-above the psychotherapy rationale.")
(citations omitted).
302. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 431 (noting that Poddar did not specifically identify Tarasoff as the victim,
but Poddar provided enough details for psychotherapist to identify her as the victim).
303. See Vikram S. Mangalmurti, Psychotherapist'sFearof Tarasoff: All in the Mind?, 22 J. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 379,384 (1994); see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-517.02 (West 1997) (threats of immediate serious
harm or death to clearly identified or identifiable victim); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14a-102 (1996) (threat of violence
against readily identifiable victim); Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Statutory Approaches to Limiting Psychiatrist's
Liabilityfor Their Patient's Violent Acts, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 821, 824 (1989) (noting that jurisdictions that
have adopted the Tarasoffduty to protect "are nearly unanimous in requiring that victims be identifiable").
304. See Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360 (stating that "dangerous patient" exception applies where disclosure of
patient's communications is only means to avert threat of serious harm).
305. Chase , 301 F.3d at 1024 (stating that "dangerous patient" exception applies where "a threat of harm
is serious and imminent").
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ment, 30 6 but both circuits faltered in attempting to define the contours of a psychotherapist's belief that imminent harm exists.
The Tenth Circuit, for example, permits the psychotherapist to determine whether
imminent harm exists only when the patient first utters a threatening statement.3 7
Under this rule, a psychotherapist must ignore developments that occur after the
patient makes the initial statement; however, a patient may later reveal related
information that increases the imminence or seriousness of his initial threat. In
Hayes, for instance, the patient, Roy Lee Hayes, told a social worker that he wanted
to kill his supervisor.30 8 The social worker, however, concluded that Hayes posed no
risk of imminent harm to his supervisor."° Later, however, the social worker became
alarmed when Hayes stated he had studied his supervisor's daily habits, knew where
she lived, and provided details about how he would kill her." l
Undoubtedly, this subsequent information increased the seriousness of Hayes'
initial statements. Yet, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Glass arguably prohibits
courts from considering subsequently-revealed information in deciding whether to
apply the "dangerous patient" exception."' Such a rule defies common sense and
should not be followed. Instead, courts should consider the following two factors in
deciding whether the patient poses an imminent risk of harm: (1) whether the
psychotherapist believed the threat was serious when uttered or (2) whether the
psychotherapist learned subsequent information that increased the seriousness of the
initial threat.
In contrast to the Tenth Circuit's overly restrictive approach, the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Chase I failed to articulate any definable standard for future courts to
assess a psychotherapist's belief that his patient poses a risk of imminent harm.312
For example, the Chase I court suggested a psychotherapist's mere subjective belief
that imminent harm exists could trigger the "dangerous patient" exception, but the
court expressly declined to establish any bright-line rule for future cases.3" 3 As such,
306. Harris, supra note 6, at 51.
Given the utilitarian balance already struck by Jaffee in creating the [psychotherapist-patient]
privilege, the starting point of the analysis is straightforward. If the value of maintaining the confidentiality of the therapeutic relationship justifies any consequent loss of relevant evidence, an
exception to the privilege should not be allowed unless it would serve some other, overriding
purpose.
Id.
307. See Glass, 133 F.3d at 1359-60 (applying "dangerous patient" exception only where threat "was serious
when it was uttered" and noting that, "when the statement was made, the treating psychiatrist did not contact
authorities").
308. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 580.
309. Id.
310. Id.

311. See Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360 (stating "dangerous patient" exception applies if "threat was serious when
it was uttered").
312. ChaseL, 301 F.3dat 1025.
313. Id.
We need not decide here what will suffice to lower the bar for admissibility of a psychotherapist's testimony as to otherwise privileged communications-for example, whether the psychotherapist's subjectively perceived prospects of imminent harm could be adequate, or whether
instead such perception must be objectively reasonable. Those boundaries for operation of the
Jaffee footnote are better left for future case development. For the present it is enough to say that
Dr. Dieter's view of the situation can fairly be considered to have been reasonable in itself.
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the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Chase I left open the crucial question of whether the
"dangerous patient" exception requires a psychotherapist to objectively or subjec314
tively believe that his patient poses an imminent threat of harm.
The following two reasons illustrate why courts should require the psychotherapist to objectively believe that his patient poses a risk of imminent harm. First, an
objective approach ensures the judge, not the psychotherapist, makes the315ultimate
evidentiary ruling. The Sixth Circuit in Hayes touched on this issue. While
ultimately rejecting the "dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases, the Sixth
Circuit cautioned against relying on a psychotherapist's individual assessment of
6
whether the exception should apply. Indeed, if courts adopt a subjective model,
a psychotherapist's otherwise unreasonable belief of imminent harm could trigger
the "dangerous patient" exception. But this would place317evidentiary decisions in the
hands of those lacking legal training or experience. An objective model, by
contrast, allows a judge to decide whether the psychotherapist reasonably believed
that imminent danger existed. Evidentiary decisions belong to those with legal
training. Simultaneously, an objective approach would alleviate the Ninth Circuit's
concerns in Chase II about the varying state disclosure laws affecting federal
evidentiary decisions.3"' Under an objective model, all decisions relating to the
"dangerous patient" exception would be decided under the same criteria, regardless
of the state's law.
Second, requiring an objective model ensures that courts will not confuse a
psychotherapist's fear of personal liability with the psychotherapist's actual belief
that the patient poses a risk of imminent harm. Under Tarasoff, psychotherapists
319
have a legal duty to protect potential victims. If a psychotherapist fails to discharge that duty, victims can recover significant monetary damages from the
psychotherapist.32 Commentators from the psychotherapeutic community recognize
321
the anxiety this possibility engenders in psychotherapists. Indeed, the fear of
personal liability encourages psychotherapists to discharge their duty to protect as
soon as possible.322 An anxious psychotherapist would likely err in favor of

314. Id.
315. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584.
316. Id. ("More fundamentally, we think it would be rather perverse and unjust to condition the freedom of
individuals on the competency of a treating psychotherapist.").
317. Presumably, the Sixth Circuit would still reject this test, because the standards that constitute an
"objective belief of imminent harm" would differ among the states. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584 ("Moreover, it cannot
be the case that the scope of a federal testimonial privilege should vary depending upon state determinations of what
constitutes 'reasonable' professional conduct."). But no reason exists to believe that courts could not consistently
determine whether or not a psychotherapist objectively believed his patient posed a threat of imminent harm.
318. Chase H, 340 F.3d at 988 ("The Federal Rules of Evidence should apply uniformly and not vary
depending on the state in which the defendant resides.").
319. Tarasoff,551 P.2d at 342-43.
320. See Leong et al., supra note 277, at 149 ("Failure to discharge [the duty to protect] properly, coupled
with a subsequent injury to the threatened person, exposes the therapist to civil damages for malpractice.").
321. Id. ("Since violence perpetrated by patients is not always preventable. The existence of a duty to protect
serves as a continuing source of anxiety for the malpractice-conscious psychotherapist.").
322. Paul S. Appelbaum, The New Preventive Detention: Psychiatry's Problematic Responsibility for the
Control of Violence, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 779, 779-81 (1988) (noting that fear of potential liability provides
"powerful incentives" for psychotherapists to discharge duty to protect against patients that may not constitute an
actual threat).
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discharging his duty to protect in close cases. 323 But a psychotherapist's concern
about personal liability should bear no relevance to whether the "dangerous patient"
exception should apply in a given case. Instead, the exception should apply solely
to protect innocent victims.
Under a subjective approach, however, courts may equate a psychotherapist's
duty to protect with the psychotherapist's belief that his patient poses a risk of
imminent harm. Prosecutors could argue that, when a psychotherapist discharges his
Tarasoffduty, the psychotherapist subjectively believes imminent harm exists. The
psychotherapist's fear of legal exposure, however, may have caused him to
prematurely discharge his duty to protect.324 Courts, therefore, should not rely on the
psychotherapist's exercise of this duty as evidence that the psychotherapist actually
believes his patient poses a risk of imminent harm. Instead, courts should apply the
"dangerous patient" exception only where a court determines that the psychotherapist' s belief of imminent harm was reasonable.
It would, of course, be impossible to precisely define
"objectively reasonable belief that imminent harm exists" for what constitutes an
every case. But at a
minimum, an objectively reasonable belief of imminent harm exists where the
patient discloses sufficient details about both his intended victim and his accompanying plan to conumit a violent crime against that victim.
The facts of Chase exemplify this point. In Chase, three factors justified the
psychotherapist's belief that Chase posed an imminent threat of harm. First, Chase
kept a list of the names, addresses, and social security numbers of his intended
victims in his appointment book.325 Second, he described the steps he had taken to
track down his victims. 32 6 Third, he stated that he had located all but four of his
victims and began targeting their children as well.327 These facts,328 taken together
and coupled with Chase's initial homicidal threats, provided objective evidence that
Chase posed an imminent threat of harm to his intended victims. 3 29

323. See id. at 779-82 ("Fear of liability has led some psychiatrists to hospitalize, solely for the purpose
of
preventing violence, patients who do not otherwise require inpatient care... Psychiatrists are responding rationally
by seeking to minimize liability, albeit at the cost of compromising their notions of what constitutes appropriate
psychiatric care....").
324. Ginger Mayor McClarren, The PsychiatricDuty to Warn: Walking a Tightrope of Uncertainty, 56
U.
CIN. L. REV. 269, 280 (1987) (noting that a "therapist who chooses not to warn may be liable to the victim
of a
patient's intentional or negligent acts").
325. Chase 1, 301 F.3d at 1021.
326. Id. at 1025.
327. Id. at 1022.
328. The Ninth Circuit cited two other instances showing that Chase posed an imminent threat of harm to
his
victim: (1) Chase had mentioned his life insurance policy to Dr. Dieter and (2) Chase "had described other stresses
in his life, including alcohol consumption and arguments with his wife." Id. at 1025. Reasonable minds
may
disagree whether either of these examples objectively indicates a reasonable belief that imminent harm exists.
The
first-mentioning his life insurance policy-seemingly indicates that the patient planned to kill himself. Moreover,
he mentioned this in a completely different context from his initial threats. Id. at 1021. The second-consuming
alcohol and arguing with his spouse-seems too ephemeral to indicate an actual threat of harm. Indeed, one
would
imagine that significant portions of the nation's population both consume alcohol and despair over arguments
with
their spouses.
329. In Chase 11, the Ninth Circuit, while ultimately rejecting a "dangerous patient" exception in criminal
cases, found that the facts surrounding Chase's threats justified the physician's decision to disclose
Chase's
threatening statements. 340 F.3d at 985 ("In the circumstances of this case, we have no doubt that Dr.
Dieter
properly disclosed the threats that Defendant had related regarding several specific individuals.").
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The facts of Hayes are also instructive. On two occasions, Hayes described the
manner in which he planned to kill his intended victim.33 ° He also stated he knew
details about his intended victim's home and schedule, including when she would
be home alone.33' Moreover, Hayes expressed an escalating desire to murder his
3 32
intended victim each time that he spoke with the social worker. These facts show
the social worker objectively believed that Hayes posed a risk of imminent harm to
the intended victim.
The patients in both Hayes and Chase exhibited the desire, the means, and the
opportunity to injure their respective victims. In the future, courts addressing similar
circumstances should find that a psychotherapist acts reasonably in believing that
his patient poses an imminent threat of harm.
3. Explicit Warning
In order to preserve the atmosphere of confidence and trust between a psychotherapist and his patient, courts should not allow psychotherapists to testify unless they
have first given their patients an explicit warning that their statements may not be
kept confidential. As explained below, requiring explicit warnings ensures patients'
confidences are not revealed solely on the basis of preliminary and routine warnings
given at the outset of any therapy.
The American Psychological Association's ethical rules require a psychotherapist
to disclose "the relevant limitations on confidentiality" at the outset of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.33 3 Courts deciding whether to apply a "dangerous patient"
exception in criminal cases disagree over the significance of this disclosure. The
Sixth Circuit, on the one hand, finds such initial disclosures inapposite to whether
334
the "dangerous patient" exception should apply in criminal cases. Instead, the
about a
warnings
Sixth Circuit believes only specific and individually tailored
psychotherapist's testimony can justify a "dangerous patient" exception:
It is one thing to inform a patient of the "duty to protect"; it is quite another to
advise a patient that his "trusted" confidant may one day assist in procuring his
conviction and incarceration .... What cannot be forgotten, in cases of this sort,
is that patients such as Hayes often suffer from serious mental and/or emotional
disorders. Consequently, it must be the law that, in order to secure a valid waiver
of the protections of the psychotherapist/patient privilege from a patient, a
of the consepsychotherapist must provide that patient with an explanation 335
quences of that waiver suited to the unique needs of that patient.
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Chase I did not discuss the effect of a physician's initial or subsequent confidentiality warnings. 336 Rather, the Chase I court

330. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 580.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 586 (citing AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT, Standard 5.01 (Dec. 1992)).

334. Id.
335. Id. at 586-87.
336. Chase I, 301 F.3d at 1024-25 (failing to discuss relevance of initial or subsequent confidentiality
warnings).
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apparently assumed patients automatically waive all rights to confidentiality by
simply making threats of imminent harm.337 Subsequently, in Chase II, the Ninth
Circuit indicated that a "dangerous patient" exception would apply if the patient
received a routine warning that the physician might testify about any threatening
statements the patient might make in the course of therapy.338
None of these approaches,* however, balances society's interest in protecting
victims with the patient's interest in becoming a functioning member of society.
Courts should consider these competing interests in weighing the effects of a
psychotherapist's warnings concerning the limits of confidentiality. For example,
a rule that patients automatically waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege by
accepting a psychotherapist's initial confidentiality disclosure effectively means
patients will forfeit their privilege anytime they seek therapy. This, in turn, frustrates
the public's interest in "facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for
' At the
individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem."339
opposite extreme, a rule that preserves the privilege, even where a patient has received
a clear warning not to expect confidentiality, elevates the patient's individual
interests over society's interests in protecting intended victims. Indeed, courts
requiring psychotherapists to utter "magic words" 3" that precisely delineate how and
when the psychotherapist may disclose a patient's threatening remarks place form
above matter. Moreover, these courts place an unrealistic burden on psychotherapists.
Instead, courts can strike the proper balance between the public and the patient's
interests by asking the following question: did the patient receive an "explicit warning" informing him that he had no expectation of confidentiality? A patient receives
an "explicit warning" when, in the course of treatment or diagnosis, a patient makes
a threatening statement to a psychotherapist and the psychotherapist informs the
patient that the psychotherapist will not keep any subsequent threat confidential for
any purpose. Courts should implement this "explicit warning" model to determine
if the "dangerous patient" exception applies in a given criminal case. Assuming the
exception applies, a psychotherapist can testify about threatening statements that the
patient makes after receiving an "explicit warning."'" This approach resolves the
inequitable consequences arising from either the Ninth Circuit or the Sixth Circuit's
model. 342 It prohibits courts from equating a psychotherapist's routine confidential-

337. In Chase I, the Ninth Circuit stated that it found persuasive the dissenting opinion in Hayes. Id. In his
dissent in Hayes, Judge Boggs argued that patients aware of the limits in confidentiality waive the psychotherapistpatient privilege by making threats. 227 F.3d at 588 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
338. Chase 1I, 340 F.3d at 988 n.5. ("We need not decide whether the result would be different if a
psychotherapist informed a patient ahead of time that she would testify in court; arguably, the patient in that
circumstance would be agreeing that the subsequent communication was not confidential.").
339. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11.
340. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 588 (Boggs, J., dissenting) ("The fact that Radford and Van Dyke did not use magic
words like 'I can testify against you in court about what you tell me' as opposed to simply implying 'I can tell the
police about what you tell me' should not be decisive.").
341. Id. at 589 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (suggesting that psychotherapist "could not testify about anything said
up to the point at which notice is given that the actual or threatened criminal conduct being discussed is no longer
covered by confidentiality").
342. See id. at 586 (refusing to apply "dangerous patient" exception even though patient received numerous
warnings that threatening statements toward his supervisor would not be kept confidential); see also Chase 1, 301
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ity disclosure with a patient's knowing waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. Moreover, the "explicit warning" model prohibits courts from ignoring
the patient's knowledge that he has no right to expect continued confidentiality in
particular statements.
To illustrate, the "explicit warning" model would allow a psychotherapist's testimony about the threatening statements in Hayes. As detailed above, Hayes sought
3
treatment from two sources, a psychotherapist and a social worker. He told them
both that he wanted to kill his supervisor.' Both treating sources warned Hayes that
they would not keep his threats confidential.s Moreover, both treating sources told
Hayes they would report his threats to the police.3 6 After Hayes received the first
such warning, he knew he had no right to confidentiality in any subsequent threats
that he might make. Nevertheless, he continued to make escalating threats of serious
harm.347 Courts should apply the "dangerous patient" exception under similar
circumstances, assuming the remaining elements of the proposed test are met.
Critics may argue that, under the "explicit warning" model, the patient gets one
free bite at the apple. In other words, the patient must threaten a third party before
the psychotherapist can give the patient an explicit confidentiality warning. The
psychotherapist cannot testify about the initial threat.
This criticism, however, ignores the policy justifying the "dangerous patient"
exception. The exception is not designed to punish patients that threaten harm to a
third party. 348 Rather, the exception should exist only to prevent the patient from
harming third parties. 349 Thus, whether the patient is allowed to utter one threat
without consequences is immaterial. In any event, it is unlikely that a person truly
posing an imminent threat of harm will actually stop making threatening statements
after receiving an "explicit warning." Indeed, the facts of Chase and Hayes show
that explicit warnings do not deter disturbed individuals from making threats.35 °
4. No Other Reasonable Way to Avert Harm
Finally, in order to prevent a patient's confidences from being needlessly
revealed, courts should prohibit a psychotherapist's testimony unless there is no
other reasonable way to avert the harm. This hurdle, however, should not be placed
so high as to require no other means possible, regardless of how unreasonable, to
avert the harm.
Both the Sixth Circuit in Hayes and the Ninth Circuit in Chase I recognized a
"dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases only where disclosing the patient's

F.3d at 1024 (seemingly equating routine confidentiality warning with waiver of all subsequent threatening
statements).
343. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 580.
)44. Id.
345. Id. at 588. The record does not indicate if either of Hayes' psychotherapists provided Hayes with an
initial disclosure about a psychotherapist's limits on keeping threats confidential. But the record affirmatively shows
that Hayes received three separate disclosure warnings after threatening his supervisor's life.
346. Id. at 580.
347. Id.
348. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19 (stating that exception may exist to avert harm to third parties).
349. See id.
350. Chase 1, 301 F.3d at 1021-22; see also Hayes, 227 F.3d at 580.
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statements constituted "the only means of averting harm" to the intended victim. 35'
Neither circuit defined the circumstances under which future courts may find
disclosure of a patient's threatening remarks constitutes "the only means of averting
harm." Conceivably, under this standard, even unreasonable alternatives to disclosure could defeat applicability of the "dangerous patient" exception. This result,
however, would render recognition of the "dangerous patient" exception a moot
point.
Not surprisingly, courts determining whether to apply the "dangerous patient"
exception have not strictly adhered to the stated rule.352 Instead, courts apply the
exception where the psychotherapist possesses no "reasonable alternative" to disclosing the patient's statements. In Chase I, for example, the psychotherapist
reasonably believed she could not prevent harm without disclosing her patient's
statements.353 Accordingly, the Chase I court condoned applying the "dangerous
patient" exception and allowed the psychotherapist to testify about those statements.354
Courts deciding whether or not to apply the "dangerous patient" exception should
embrace this approach. It promotes fairness to patients while relieving prosecutors
from the unduly onerous burden of proving that no conceivable alteratives to
disclosure exist.
5. Limiting the Psychotherapist'sTestimony
Assuming the facts of a given case satisfy the four elements above, courts should
allow psychotherapists to testify about their patients' statements. This, however,
raises yet another question: what limits should courts place on the psychotherapist's
testimony? Thus far, no court has answered this question. Certainly patients and
prosecutors have differing ideas on just how courts should do so. Patients, of course,
would most likely seek to limit the psychotherapist's testimony as much as possible.
Indeed, a patient would prefer that courts prevent his psychotherapist from revealing
any of the patient's statements. Prosecutors, by contrast, would urge courts to allow
psychotherapists to testify about any relevant statements the patient made. A rule
adopting this approach would, for example, permit prosecutors to inquire about the
causes of a patient's hostility toward a particular victim. Such inquiries would likely
reveal the patient's most private and embarrassing thoughts and beliefs. Indeed,
some commentators have cited the patient's right to privacy as an argument against

351. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360; Chase 1, 301 F.3d at 1024 (holding that "dangerous patient" exception applies
when "the harm can be averted only by means of disclosure by the therapist").
352. See, e.g., infra notes 353-354 and accompanying text.
353. Chase I, 301 F.3d at 1025.
354. See id.
Dr. Dieter testified that she considered initiating civil commitment procedures but concluded that
it was unlikely that Chase would be held for longer than 72 hours due to his lack of a
committable mental illness. Dr. Dieter was also concerned about a prior threat Chase had made
to harm himself or clinic staff if any attempt were made to hospitalize him against his will. Thus,
we find that Dr. Dieter reasonably considered disclosure to law enforcement authorities to be the
only effective means of averting harm.
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applying the "dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases.355 Likewise, the
Supreme Court of the United States noted that effective therapy often requires
patients to disclose to their psychotherapist embarrassing and disgraceful communications.356
These considerations should compel courts to strictly limit the statements to
which a psychotherapist can testify. Specifically, courts should permit psychotherapists to testify only to the following: (1) statements that the patient made after the
' and (2) statements showing
psychotherapist gave the patient an "explicit warning"357
that the patient poses or posed an imminent threat of harm to the specific victim.
This model permits a prosecutor to elicit information necessary to prove his case
and, thereby, protect the intended victim. Meanwhile, this model prohibits
prosecutors from eliciting psychotherapist testimony that is not directly related to
the charged offense. Thus, this model does not discourage patients from confiding
in their psychotherapists.3" 8
To date, however, courts have not yet placed these necessary limitations on
psychotherapist testimony. For example, in Chase I, the patient was charged with
threatening to kill FBI agents.359 The district court allowed Chase's psychotherapist
to testify about the threatening statements Chase made against FBI agents.3" But

355. See Harris,supra note 6, at 55-56.
Exception to the evidentiary privilege would exact a much greater burden on that privacy interest
than does the therapists Tarasoffduty to breach confidentiality. A therapist's Tarasoffwarning
typically entails notification only to law enforcement authorities and/or the potential victim that
the patient poses a danger. It does not typically require a repetition of the patient's confidential
statements to the therapist, but merely private notice that the patient may be a threat to the
potential victim's safety. Exception to the evidentiary privilege, on the other hand, would entail
the therapist's public testimony to the most intimate details of the patient's dangerous thoughts
that have been shared with the therapist. Sharing of such thoughts is, of course, encouraged by
the therapeutic process in an atmosphere of utmost confidence and safety for the very purpose
of allowing the therapist to intervene and help the patient successfully manage those thoughts.
Hearing those thoughts played back in a public courtroom and used to create a criminal case
against the patient would be a drastic infringement on the patient's legitimate expectation of
privacy.
Id.
356. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
357. See supra pp. 143-145.
dissenting).
358. See, e.g., Hayes, 227 F.3d at 588 (Boggs, J.,
All of the court's concerns in support of encouraging persons to confide in mental health
professionals would be satisfied by a more limited rule that such recipients of information could
not testify about anything said up to the point at which notice is given that the actual or
threatened criminal conduct being discussed is no longer covered by confidentiality.
Id.; see also West, supra note 298, at 905 (noting that patient's decision to bring lawsuit where mental state is at
issue should not amount to complete waiver of psychotherapist-patient privilege:
A plaintiff's choice to bring a lawsuit, possibly requiring that some personal information be
revealed, does not reduce his or her privacy interest in other personal information. In court,
plaintiffs need not disclose personal information not relevant to the case. In therapy, however,
issues are not compartmentalized; rather, they are explored within the context of the patient's
life. For example, in treating a patient who is having difficulties coping with discrimination in
the workplace, it would be helpful for a therapist to know that the patient has a history of
childhood sexual abuse. The patient's lawsuit in no way reduces his or her interest in keeping
the childhood victimization private.)
359. Chase 1, 301 F.3d at 1022. Chase was also charged with one count involving possession of a firearm.
360. Id. at 1024 n.2.
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inexplicably, neither the district court nor the three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
limited the psychotherapist's testimony to statements that were related to the
charged offense. 36' For instance, Chase's psychotherapist testified about threats
Chase made to a "number of people associated with his former business and legal
proceedings. 362 Chase, however, was not charged with threatening any of these
people.3 63 As such, the court should have prohibited this testimony.
Likewise, future courts should limit the extent to which a psychotherapist may
reveal his patient's confidential statements. Specifically, courts should permit
psychotherapists to testify about only those statements that are directly relevant to
the charged offense. If courts question the relevancy of a given statement, they
should err in favor of protecting the patient's privacy interests. This strict rule allows
the prosecutor to elicit only truly relevant information while protecting the patient's
right to privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee v. Redmond established a federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege. Courts now must decide if and when exceptions
to that privilege exist. Protecting potential victims from the risk of harm posed by
dangerous patients justifies a "dangerous patient" exception in criminal cases. But,
as discussed above, protecting potential victims oftentimes clashes with society's
interest in facilitating mental health treatment for disturbed individuals.364 Courts,
therefore, must find a way to resolve this tension by carving out an exception that
properly
balances these two competing interests. Thus far, no court has achieved this
365
feat.
The proposed framework in this article strives to provide courts with a
mechanism to strike the proper balance. On the one hand, the framework allows
prosecutors to elicit a patient's statements through psychotherapist testimony when
the patient poses an imminent threat of harm to a specific individual. This serves
society's interest in protecting potential victims. On the other hand, the framework
imposes strict limits both on when the exception applies and the extent to which the
psychotherapist can reveal the patient's confidential statements. Thus, by applying
this proposed framework, courts can simultaneously protect the patient's right to
privacy while providing the patient clear notice of when that right ends.

361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id. at 1021-22 (summarizing threats that Chase made to business and legal associates and their children).
Id. at 1021.
Id. at 1022.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part HI.

